Environment-induced decoherence and superselection have been a subject of intensive research over the past two decades. Yet, their implications for the foundational problems of quantum mechanics, most notably the quantum measurement problem, have remained a matter of great controversy. This paper is intended to clarify key features of the decoherence program, including its more recent results, and to investigate their implications for foundational issues, not only concerning the measurement problem but also with respect to the main interpretive approaches of quantum mechanics.
The implications of the decoherence program 1 for the foundations of quantum mechanics have been subject of an ongoing debate since the first precise formulation of the program in the early 1980s. The key idea promoted by decoherence is based on the insight that realistic quantum systems are never isolated, but are immersed into the surrounding environment and interact continuously with it. The decoherence program then studies, entirely within the standard quantum formalism (i.e., without adding any new elements into the mathematical theory or its interpretation), the resulting formation of quantum correlations between the states of the system and its environment and the often surprising effects of these system-environment interactions. In short, decoherence 1 Most of the pioneering and important ideas relevant to the development of the theory of decoherence can be found in Zeh (1970, 1973) , Kübler and Zeh (1973) , Joos and Zeh (1985) , and Zurek (1981 Zurek ( , 1982 Zurek ( , 1993 . For reviews of the decoherence program, see Blanchard et al. (2000) , Joos (1999) , Joos et al. (2003) , Kiefer and Joos (1998) , Zeh ( , 1996 Zeh ( , 1999a , and Zurek (1991 Zurek ( , 1993 Zurek ( , 2003a .
brings about a local suppression of interference between preferred states selected by the interaction with the environment. Proponents of decoherence call it an "historical accident" (Joos, 1999, p. 13 ) that the implications for quantum mechanics and for the associated foundational problems were overlooked for so long. Zurek (2003, p. 717) suggests:
The idea that the "openness" of quantum systems might have anything to do with the transition from quantum to classical was ignored for a very long time, probably because in classical physics problems of fundamental importance were always settled in isolated systems. Bub (1997) , although rather sceptical of the relevance of decoherence for foundational problems, calls decoherence part of the "new orthodoxy" of understanding quantum mechanics-as the working physicist's way of motivating the postulates of quantum mechanics from physical principles.
When the concept of decoherence was first introduced to the broader scientific audience by Zurek's (1991) article that appeared in Physics Today, it sparked a series of controversial comments from the readership (see the April 1993 issue of Physics Today). In response to critics, Zurek (2003a, p. 718) 
states:
In a field where controversy has reigned for so long this resistance to a new paradigm [namely, to decoherence] is no surprise. Omnès (2003, p. 2) assesses:
The discovery of decoherence has already much improved our understanding of quantum mechanics. (. . . ) [B] ut its foundation, the range of its validity and its full meaning are still rather obscure. This is due most probably to the fact that it deals with deep aspects of physics, not yet fully investigated.
In particular, the question whether decoherence provides, or at least suggests, a solution to the measurement problem (the experience of definite pointer readings and the preferred basis problem), has been discussed for several years. For example, Anderson (2001, p. 492) writes in an essay review:
The last chapter (. . . ) deals with the quantum measurement problem (. . . ). My main test, allowing me to bypass the extensive discussion, was a quick, unsuccessful search in the index for the word "decoherence" which describes the process that used to be called "collapse of the wave function".
Zurek speaks in various places of the "apparent" or "effective" collapse of the wave function induced by the interaction with environment (when embedded into a minimal additional interpretive framework), and concludes (Zurek, 1998 (Zurek, , p. 1793 
):
A "collapse" in the traditional sense is no longer necessary. (. . . ) [The] emergence of "objective existence" [from decoherence] (. . . ) significantly reduces and perhaps even eliminates the role of the "collapse" of the state vector. D'Espagnat, who advocates a view that considers the explanation of our experiences (i.e., the "appearances") as the only "sure" demand for a physical theory, states (d 'Espagnat, 2000, p. 136) :
For macroscopic systems, the appearances are those of a classical world (no interferences etc.), even in circumstances, such as those occurring in quantum measurements, where quantum effects take place and quantum probabilities intervene (. . . ). Decoherence explains the just mentioned appearances and this is a most important result. (. . . ) As long as we remain within the realm of mere predictions concerning what we shall observe (i.e., what will appear to us)-and refrain from stating anything concerning "things as they must be before we observe them"-no break in the linearity of quantum dynamics is necessary.
In his monumental book on the foundations of quantum mechanics, Auletta (2000, p. 791) concludes that On the other hand, even leading adherents of decoherence have expressed caution in expecting that decoherence has solved the measurement problem. Joos (1999, p. 14) writes:
Does decoherence solve the measurement problem? Clearly not. What decoherence tells us, is that certain objects appear classical when they are observed. But what is an observation? At some stage, we still have to apply the usual probability rules of quantum theory.
Along these lines, Kiefer and Joos (1998, p. 5) warn that:
One often finds explicit or implicit statements to the effect that the above processes are equivalent to the collapse of the wave function (or even solve the measurement problem). Such statements are certainly unfounded.
In a response to Anderson's (2001 ) comment, Adler (2003 states: I do not believe that either detailed theoretical calculations or recent experimental results show that decoherence has resolved the difficulties associated with quantum measurement theory.
Similarly, Bacciagaluppi (2003b, p. 3) 
writes:
Claims that simultaneously the measurement problem is real [and] decoherence solves it are confused at best.
Zeh asserts (Joos et al., 2003, Ch. 2 
):
Decoherence by itself does not yet solve the measurement problem (. . . ). This argument is nonetheless found wide-spread in the literature. (. . . ) It does seem that the measurement problem can only be resolved if the Schrödinger dynamics (. . . ) is supplemented by a nonunitary collapse (. . . ).
The key achievements of the decoherence program, apart from their implications for conceptual problems, do not seem to be universally understood either. Zurek (1998 Zurek ( , p. 1800 remarks:
[The] eventual diagonality of the density matrix (. . . ) is a byproduct (. . . ) but not the essence of decoherence. I emphasize this because diagonality of [the density matrix] in some basis has been occasionally (mis-) interpreted as a key accomplishment of decoherence. This is misleading. Any density matrix is diagonal in some basis. This has little bearing on the interpretation.
These controversial remarks show that a balanced discussion of the key features of decoherence and their implications for the foundations of quantum mechanics is overdue. The decoherence program has made great progress over the past decade, and it would be inappropriate to ignore its relevance in tackling conceptual problems. However, it is equally important to realize the limitations of decoherence in providing consistent and noncircular answers to foundational questions.
An excellent review of the decoherence program has recently been given by Zurek (2003a) . It dominantly deals with the technicalities of decoherence, although it contains some discussion on how decoherence can be employed in the context of a relative-state interpretation to motivate basic postulates of quantum mechanics. While the present paper was in the final stages of preparation, Bacciagaluppi (2003a) contributed an entry to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the rôle of decoherence in the foundations of quantum mechanics, including comments on the relation of decoherence to several popular interpretations of quantum theory. The reader might find it useful to consult Bacciagaluppi's relatively short (in comparison to the present paper) discussion for a helpful first orientation and overview. In spite of these valuable recent contributions to the literature, a detailed and self-contained discussion of the rôle of decoherence in the foundations of quantum mechanics seems still outstanding. The present paper is intended to fill this gap.
To set the stage, we shall first, in Sec. II, review the measurement problem, which illustrates the key difficulties that are associated with describing quantum measurement within the quantum formalism and that are all in some form addressed by the decoherence program. In Sec. III, we then introduce the main features of the theory of decoherence. These two sections are brought together in Sec. IV where we discuss if and how decoherence resolves the measurement problem in the context of standard "textbook" quantum mechanics. Finally, in Sec. V, we investigate how decoherence can motivate and support (or falsify) proposed solutions to the measurement problem in alternative interpretive approaches of quantum mechanics, such as physical collapse theories, Everett-style relative-state interpretations, the consistent histories approach, Bohmian mechanics, and modal interpretations.
II. THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM
One of the most revolutionary elements introduced into physical theory by quantum mechanics is the principle of superposition, mathematically founded in the linearity of the Hilbert state space. If |1 and |2 are two states, then quantum mechanics tells us that also any linear combination α|1 + β|2 corresponds to a possible state.
Whereas such superpositions of states have been experimentally extensively verified for microscopic systems (for instance through the observation of interference effects), the application of the formalism to macroscopic systems appears to lead immediately to severe clashes with our experience of the everyday world. Neither has a book ever observed to be in a state of being both "here" and "there" (i.e., to be in a superposition of positions), nor seems a Schrödinger cat that is a superposition of being alive and dead to bear much resemblence to reality as we perceive it. The problem is then how to reconcile the vastness of the Hilbert space of possible states with the observation of a comparably few "classical" states, defined by having a small number of determinate and robust properties such as position and momentum. Why does the world appear classical to us, in spite of its supposed underlying quantum nature that would in principle allow for arbitrary superpositions?
A. Quantum measurement scheme
This difficulty is usually illustrated in the context of quantum measurement where microscopic superpositions are, via quantum entanglement, amplified into the macroscopic realm, and thus lead to very "nonclassical" states that do not seem to correspond to what is actually perceived at the end of the measurement. In the ideal measurement scheme devised by von Neumann (1932) , a (typically microscopic) system S, described by basis vectors {|s n } in a Hilbert state space H S , interacts with a measurement apparatus A, represented by basis vectors {|a n } spanning a Hilbert space H A , where the |a n are assumed to correspond to macroscopically distinguishable "pointer" positions that correspond to the outcome of a measurement if S is in the state |s n . 2 If, however, S is in a (microscopically "unproblematic") superposition n c n |s n , and A is in the initial "ready" state |a r , the linearity of the Schrödinger equation entails that the total system SA, represented by the Hilbert product space H S ⊗ H A , evolves according to n c n |s n |a r t −→ n c n |s n |a n .
(2.1)
This dynamical evolution is often referred to as a premeasurement in order to emphasize that the process described by Eq. (2.1) does not suffice to claim that a measurement has actually been completed. This is so because (i) the rhs is a superposition of system-apparatus states, thus no definite pointer position seems to have been attained (failure of definite outcomes); (ii) the expansion of the final state is in general not unique, and therefore the measured observable is not uniquely defined either (preferred basis problem). Issue (i) is in the literature typically referred to as the measurement problem, but (ii) is at least equally important, since it does not make sense to even inquire about the existence of a specific outcome if the set of possible outcomes is not clearly defined. We shall therefore regard the measurement problem as composed of both (i) and (ii), and discuss these components in more detail in the following.
B. Failure of definite outcomes
Outline of the problem
The rhs of Eq. (2.1) implies that after the premeasurement the combined system SA is left in a pure state that represents a linear superposition of system-pointer states. According to the eigenvalue-eigenstate ("e-e") link of orthodox quantum mechanics, an observable corresponding to a physical quantity has a definite value if and only if the system is in an eigenstate of the observable; if the system is however in a superposition of such eigenstates, as in Eq. (2.1), it is, according to the orthodox interpretation, meaningless to speak of the state of the system as having any definite value of the observable at all. In other words, the description of measurements within the formalism of quantum theory according to Eq. (2.1) entails that measurements in general fail to have outcomes.
It is crucial to note that the e-e link also entails that the superposition on the rhs of Eq. (2.1) is not ignoranceinterpretable, that is, it is not legitimate to read it as referring to an ensemble of definite pointer states (events), with probability |c n | 2 for the n-th event, i.e., the nth definite pointer state, to actually occur. For if this was the case, the superposition would simply represent an ensemble of more fundamentally determined states, and based on the additional knowledge brought about by the results of measurements, we could simply choose a subensemble consisting of the definite pointer state obtained in the measurement. But then, since the time evolution has been strictly deterministic according to the Schrödinger equation, we could backtrack this subensemble in time und thus also specify the initial state more completely ("post-selection"), and therefore this state necessarily could not be physically identical to the initially prepared state on the left-hand side of Eq. (2.1).
The point that no ensemble interpretation should be attached to a superposition can also be made by referring to the possibility of explicitely performing experiments that lead to the direct observation of interference patterns instead of the realization of one of the terms in the superposed pure state, for example, in a setup where electrons pass individually (one at a time) through a double slit. As it is well-known, this experiment clearly shows that (within the standard quantum mechanical formalism) the electron must not be described by either one of the wave functions describing the passage through a particular slit (ψ 1 or ψ 2 ), but only by the superposition of these wave functions (ψ 1 + ψ 2 ), since the correct density distribution ̺ of the pattern on the screen is not given by the sum of the squared wave functions describing the addition of individual passages through a single slit (̺ = |ψ 1 | 2 + |ψ 2 | 2 ), but only by the square of the sum of the individual wave functions (̺ = |ψ 1 + ψ 2 | 2 ).
What is needed to properly speak of outcomes (assuming that the e-e link holds) is the reduction of the purestate density matrix ρ SA representing the rhs of Eq. (2.1) into a (proper, ignorance-interpretable) mixture, ρ SA = mn c m c * n |s m s n ||a m a n | −→ n |c n | 2 |s n s n ||a n a n |, (2.2) which entails the destruction of interference terms m = n. This however cannot be achieved via a unitary time evolution since the characteristic values of the density matrix are constants of motion (Wigner, 1963, p. 333) .
The apparent failure to obtain unique outcomes, in contrast to our perception of them, constitutes the first part of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics; it belongs to the general (and central) problem of interpreting quantum mechanical superpositions, but emphasizes its severity by demonstrating a serious clash with our experience. The problem arises from the contradiction between our experience of determinate measurement records on one hand and the conjunction of the following three assumptions on the other hand.
(1) The lhs of Eq. (2.1) is the correct initial state for describing a measurement. That is, the initial state of the system-apparatus combination is given by the tensor product of the state of the system, represented by a superposition of eigenstates of the measured observable, with the "ready" state of the apparatus.
(2) The rhs of Eq. (2.1) is the correct final state for describing a measurement. That is, (i) the measuring apparatus acts as an "mirror" of the states of the system by forming correlations with the states of the system, (ii) the measurement is ideal ("faithful") in the sense that only correlations of the form |s m |a n with m = n but not m = n are formed, and (iii) the time evolution of the state of the system-apparatus combination is solely given by the unitary Schrödinger equation. Assumption (i) should be taken as the definition of any measuring device and will therefore not be considered as a possible point of modification. Assumption (ii) is typically, for realistic measurements, only approximately fulfilled (i.e., the rhs of Eq. (2.1) contains terms |s m |a n with m = n but usually |c mn | 2 ≪ 1), but there exist straightforward generalizations to nonideal measurement schemes, and this is not relevant to a solution of the measurement problem. We shall therefore only consider the universality of unitary dynamics as the issue at stake and discuss possible modifications of this assumption.
(3) The bidirectional e-e link holds.
Possible solutions to achieve definiteness
Assuming that no other assumptions have entered whose validity can be questioned, it is necessary and sufficient to abandon one of the three assumptions in order to solve the measurement problem. More explicitely, the possible modifications are:
(1) Modifying the initial (pre-measurement) state. We maintain the universality of the unitary evolution and the usual e-e link, but modify the representation of the initial state that is taken as the starting point of the measurement interaction. For example, it has been suggested by Fine (1987 Fine ( , 1993 that in the context of measurements it is more appropriate to describe the initial state of the system S by a mixture of eigenstates of the observable measured rather than by the full pure state superposition, since measurements selectively look only at a particular "aspect" of the system, which Fine identifies with the probability distribution of the measured observable that is fully specified by the mixed-state density matrix. With this assumption, the usual unitary dynamics then imply that the system-apparatus combination evolves into an ignorance-interpretable mixture rather than a superposition of states.
(2) Modifying the unitary dynamics. While upholding, at least approximately, the orthodox e-e link, we deny that the right-hand side of Eq. (2.1) constitutes the final outcome of the measurement, but instead add a nonunitary time evolution to the dynamical laws such as to allow for the possibility for a pure state to evolve into an ignoranceinterpretable ensemble of states (a "proper mixture"). This strategy is represented by wave function collapse theories. In general, collapse can be understood as any process that breaks the unitarity of the time evolution, which is required to transform a pure state into a proper mixture; this corresponds to a reduction of the pure-state wave function onto one of the states in the superposition ("branches"). The collapse can then either appear as a postulated fundamental counterpart to the unitary time evolution (as in orthodox quantum mechanics), be brought about by adding stochastic terms into the Schrödinger equation that induce an effective collapse for states of macroscopic systems (Ghirardi et al., 1986; Gisin, 1984; Pearle, 1979 Pearle, , 1999 , or be assumed to only occur, for example, within the mind of a conscious observer (Stapp, 1993; Wigner, 1963) .
(3) Modifying the e-e link. While upholding unitary time evolution as the universal dynamical law, and thus maintaining that the right-hand side of Eq. (2.1) indeed represents the final outcome of the measurement, we break the e-e link (at least) in the eigenvalue → eigenstate direction and thus allow, by various means, for the possibility to ascribe definite values to an observable (such as the pointer position) to a system even it is not in an eigenstate of that observable. As, for example, Bub (1997, Ch. 4) has demonstrated, upholding the ee link is not forced upon us by the structure of quantum mechanics. 3 A wide range of interpretations follow this strategy, such as modal interpretations, relative-state interpretations and Bohmian mechanics.
Objective vs. subjective definiteness
In general, (macroscopic) definiteness-and thus a solution to the problem of outcomes in the theory of quantum measurement-can be achieved either on an ontological (objective) or an observational (subjective) level. Objective definiteness aims at ensuring "actual" definiteness in the macroscopic realm, whereas subjective definiteness only attempts to explain why the macroscopic world appears to be definite-and thus does not make any claims about definiteness of the underlying physical reality (whatever this reality might be).
This raises the question of the significance of this distinction with respect to the formation of a satisfactory theory of the physical world. It might appear that a solution to the measurement problem based on ensuring subjective, but not objective, definiteness is merely good "for all practical purposes"-abbreviated, rather disparagingly, as "FAPP" by Bell (1990) -, and thus not capable of solving the "fundamental" problem that would seem relevant to the construction of the "precise theory" that Bell demanded so vehemently.
It seems to the author, however, that this critism is not justified, and that subjective definiteness should be viewed on a par with objective definitess with respect to a satisfactory solution to the measurement problem. We demand objective definiteness because we experience definiteness on the subjective level of observation, and it shall not be viewed as an a priori requirement for a satisfactory physical theory. If we knew independently of our experience that definiteness exists in nature, subjective definiteness would presumably follow as soon as we have employed a simple model that connects the "external" physical phenomena with our "internal" perceptual and cognitive apparatus, where the expected simplicity of such a model can be justified by referring to the presumed identity of the physical laws governing external and internal processes. But since knowledge is based on experience, that is, on observation, the existence of objective definiteness could only be derived from the observation of definiteness. And moreover, observation tells us that definiteness is in fact not a universal property of nature, but rather a property of macroscopic objects, where the borderline to the macroscopic realm is difficult to draw precisely; mesoscopic interference experiments have clearly demonstrated the blurriness of the boundary. Given the lack of a precise definition of the boundary, any demand for fundamental definiteness on the objective level should be based on a much deeper and more general commitment to a definiteness that applies to every physical entity (or system) across the board, regardless of spatial size, physical property, and the like.
Therefore, if we realize that the often deeply felt commitment to a general objective definiteness is only based on our experience of macroscopic systems, and that this definiteness in fact fails in an observable manner for microscopic (and, as seen more recently, also for certain mesoscopic systems), the author sees no compelling grounds on which objective definiteness must be demanded as part of a satisfactory physical theory, provided that the theory can account for subjective, observational definiteness in accordance with our experience. Thus the author suggest to attribute the same legitimacy to proposals towards the solution of the measurement problem that achieve "only" subjective but not objective definiteness-after all the measurement problem arises solely from a clash of our experience with certain implications of the quantum formalism. d 'Espagnat (2000, pp. 134-135) has advocated a similar viewpoint:
The fact that we perceive such "things" as macroscopic objects lying at distinct places is due, partly at least, to the structure of our sensory and intellectual equipment. We should not, therefore, take it as being part of the body of sure knowledge that we have to take into account for defining a quantum state. (. . . ) In fact, scientists most righly claim that the purpose of science is to describe human experience, not to describe "what really is"; and as long as we only want to describe human experience, that is, as long as we are content with being able to predict what will be observed in all possible circumstances (. . . ) we need not postulate the existence-in some absolute sense-of unobserved (i.e., not yet observed) objects lying at definite places in ordinary 3-dimensional space.
C. The preferred basis problem
The second difficulty associated with quantum measurement is known as the preferred basis problem, which demonstrates that the measured observable is in general not uniquely defined by Eq. (2.1). For any choice of system states {|s n }, we can find corresponding apparatus states {|a n }, and vice versa, to equivalently rewrite the final state emerging from the premeasurement interaction, i.e., the rhs of Eq. (2.1). In general, however, for some choice of apparatus states the corresponding new system states will not be mutually orthogonal, so that the observable associated with these states will not be Hermitian, which is usually not desired (however not forbidden-see the discussion by Zurek, 2003a) . Conversely, to ensure distinguishable outcomes, we are in general to require the orthogonality of the apparatus (pointer) states. If we therefore insist on orthogonality of the set of system and appartus states, it follows from the biorthogonal decomposition theorem that the expansion of the final premeasurement system-apparatus state of Eq. (2.1), |ψ = n c n |s n |a n , such that the same post-measurement state seems to correspond to two different measurements, namely, of the observables A = n λ n |s n s n | and B = n λ ′ n |s ′ n s ′ n | of the system, respectively, although in general A and B do not commute.
As an example, consider a Hilbert space H = H 1 ⊗ H 2 where H 1 and H 2 are two-dimensional spin spaces with states corresponding to spin up or spin down along a given axis. Suppose we are given an entangled spin state of the EPR form
where |z± 1,2 represents the eigenstates of the observable σ z corresponding to spin up or spin down along the z axis of the two systems 1 and 2, then this state can equally be expressed in the spin basis along the x axis, that is,
where now |x± 1,2 denotes the eigenstates of the observable σ x representing spin up or spin down along the x axis. Now suppose that system 2 acts as a measuring device for the spin of system 1. Then Eqs. (2.5) and (2.6) imply that the measuring device has established a correlation with both the z and the x spin of system 1. This means that, if we interpret the formation of such a correlation as a measurement in the spirit of the von Neumann scheme (without requiring a collapse), our apparatus (system 2) could be considered as having measured also the x spin once it has measured the z spin, and vice versa-in spite of the noncommutativity of the corresponding spin observables σ z and σ x . Moreover, since we can rewrite Eq. (2.5) in infinitely many ways, it appears that once the apparatus has measured the spin of system 1 along one direction, it can also be regarded of having measured the spin along any other direction, again in apparent contradiction with quantum mechanics due to the noncommutativity of the spin observables corresponding to different spatial orientations. It thus seems that quantum mechanics has nothing to say about which observable(s) of the system is (are) the ones being recorded, via the formation of quantum correlations, by the apparatus. This can be stated in a general theorem (Auletta, 2000; Zurek, 1981) : When quantum mechanics is applied to an isolated composite object consisting of a system S and an apparatus A, it cannot determine which observable of the system has been measured-in obvious contrast to our experience of the workings of measuring devices that seem to be "designed" to measure certain quantities.
D. Emergence of classicality from quantum states
In essence, as we have seen above, the measurement problem deals with the transition from a quantum world where states are described by essentially arbitrary linear superpositions of state vectors, to our perception of "classical" states, that is, a (very) small subset of the states allowed by quantum mechanical superposition principle, having only a few but determinate and robust properties, such as position, momentum, etc. In other words, if we uphold the e-e link and accept the form of the premeasurement interaction as the correct representation of quantum mechanical measurement, it is not at all clear which (i.e., the problem of a preferred basis) and how (i.e., the problem of arbitrary superposition of outcomes) particular "classical" properties are selected that appear determinate to us. The question of why and how our experience of a "classical" world emerges from quantum mechanics thus lies at the heart of the foundational problems of quantum theory.
Decoherence has been claimed to provide an explanation for this quantum-to-classical transition by appealing to the ubiquituous immersion of virtually all physical systems into their environment ("environmental monitoring"). This trend can also be read off nicely from the titles of some papers and books on decoherence, for example, "The emergence of classical properties through interaction with the environment" (Joos and Zeh, 1985) , "Decoherence and the transition from quantum to classical" (Zurek, 1991) , and "Decoherence and the appearance of a classical world in quantum theory" (Joos et al., 2003) . We shall critically investigate in this paper to what extent the appeal to decoherence for an explanation of the quantum-to-classical transition is justified.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE DECOHERENCE PROGRAM
As remarked earlier, the theory of decoherence is based on a study of the effects brought about by the interaction of physical systems with their environment. In classical physics, the environment is usually viewed as a kind of disturbance, or noise, that perturbes the system under consideration such as to negatively influence the study of its "objective" properties. Therefore science has established the idealization of isolated systems, with experimental physics aiming at eliminating any outer sources of disturbance as much as possible in order to discover the "true" underlying nature of the system under study.
The distinctly nonclassical phenomenon of quantum entanglement, however, has demonstrated that the correlations between two systems can be of fundamental importance, and can lead to properties that are not present in the individual systems. 4 The earlier view of regard-ing phenomena arising from quantum entanglement as "paradoxa" has generally been replaced by the recognition of entanglement as a fundamental property of nature.
The decoherence program (for key ideas and concepts, see, e.g., Joos and Zeh, 1985; Joos et al., 2003; Kübler and Zeh, 1973; Zeh, 1970 Zeh, , 1973 Zeh, , 1996 Zeh, , 1999a Zurek, 1981 Zurek, , 1982 Zurek, , 1991 Zurek, , 1993 Zurek, , 2003a is based on the idea that such quantum correlations are ubiquitous; that nearly every physical system must interact in some way with its environment (for example, with the surrounding photons that then create the visual experience within the observer), which typically consists of a large number of degrees of freedom that are hardly ever fully controlled. Only in very special cases of typically microscopic (atomic) phenomena, so goes the claim of the decoherence program, the idealization of isolated systems is applicable such that the predictions of linear quantum mechanics (i.e., a large class of superpositions of states) can actually be observationally confirmed; in the majority of the cases accessible to our experience, however, the interaction with the environment is so dominant as to preclude the observation of the "pure" quantum world, imposing effective superselection rules (Cisnerosy et al., 1998; Galindo et al., 1962; Giulini, 2000; Wick et al., 1952 Wick et al., , 1970 onto the space of observable states that lead to states corresponding to the "classical" properties of our experience; interference between such states gets locally suppressed and becomes thus inaccessible to the observer.
The probably most surprising aspect of decoherence is the effectiveness of the system-environment interactions. Decoherence typically takes place on extremely short time scales, and requires the presence of only a minimal environment (Joos and Zeh, 1985) . Due to the large numbers of degrees of freedom of the environment, it is usually very difficult to undo the system-environment entanglement, which has been claimed as a source of our impression of irreversibility in nature (see Zurek, 2003a, and references therein) . In general, the effect of decoherence increases with the size of the system (from microscopic to macroscopic scales), but it is important to note that there exist (admittedly somewhat exotic) examples where the decohering influence of the environment can be sufficiently shielded as to lead to macroscopic superpositions, for example, in the case of superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUIDs) where superpositions of macroscopic currents become observable. Conversely, some microscopic systems (for instance certain chiral molecules that exist in different distinct spatial configurations) can be subject to remarkably strong decoherence.
The decoherence program has dealt with the following two main consequences of environmental interaction:
Whole is different from the sum of its Parts.
1. Environment-induced superselection. The selection of a preferred sets of states ("pointer states") that are robust (in the sense of retaining correlations over time) in spite of their immersion into the environment. These states are determined by the interaction between the system and the environment and are suggested to correspond to the "classical" states of our experience. We shall survey this mechanism in Sec. III.D. Environment-induced superselection has also been employed in a variety of interpretations of quantum mechanics in order to motivate the selection of observables that receive assignments of determinate values, including for instance the definition of the "branches" in Everett-style interpretations (see Sec. V).
2. Environment-induced decoherence. The fast local suppression of interference between different states of the system in the basis chosen by environmentinduced superselection. However, since only unitary time evolution is employed, global phase coherence is not actually destroyed-it becomes absent from the local density matrix that describes the system alone, but remains fully present in the total system-environment composition. 5 We shall discuss environment-induced suppression of interference in more detail in Sec. III.E.
Another, more recent aspect related to the decoherence program, termed enviroment-assisted or "envariance", has been introduced by Zurek (2003b) . If the effect of a transformation U S = u S ⊗ I E that acts only on the system S can be undone by a second transformation U E = I S ⊗ u E that only acts on the environment E entangled with S, the composite state |ψ SE of the SE combination is said to be "envariant under u S ". This mechanism is used by Zurek (2003a,b,c) to explain the emergence of probabilities in quantum mechanics and to suggest a derivation of the Born rule. We shall discuss envariance and Zurek's derivation of Born's rule in Sec. III.G. Finally, let us emphasize that decoherence arises directly from applying the quantum mechanical formalism to a description of the interaction of a physical system with its environment. It is therefore neither an interpretation nor a modification of quantum mechanics. Also, decoherence has been extensively studied both in theoretical models and experiments (for a survey, see for example Joos et al., 2003; Zurek, 2003a) . The existence of decoherence effects can therefore be taken as a wellconfirmed fact. Of course, the aum of the present paper is to discuss the implications of these effects for foundational problems of quantum mechanics.
A. Resolution into subsystems
Note that decoherence derives from the presupposition of the existence and the possibility of a division of the world into "system(s)" and "environment". In the decoherence program, the term "environment" is usually understood as the "remainder" of the system, in the sense that its degrees of freedom are typically not (cannot, do not need to) be controlled and are not directly relevant to the observation under consideration (for example, the many microsopic degrees of freedom of the system), but that nonetheless the environment includes "all those degrees of freedom which contribute significantly to the evolution of the state of the apparatus" (Zurek, 1981) .
This system-environment dualism is generally associated with quantum entanglement that always describes a correlation between parts of the universe. Without resolving the universe into individual subsystems, the measurement problem obviously disappears: the state vector |Ψ of the entire universe (if we dare to postulate this total state-see counterarguments by Auletta, 2000) evolves deterministically according to the Schrödinger equation
which poses no interpretive difficulty. Only when we decompose the total Hilbert state space H of the universe into a product of two spaces H 1 ⊗ H 2 , and accordingly form the joint state vector |Ψ = |Ψ 1 |Ψ 2 , and want to ascribe an individual state (besides the joint state that describes a correlation) to one the two systems (say, the apparatus), the measurement problem arises. Zurek (2003a, p. 718) puts it like this:
In the absence of systems, the problem of interpretation seems to disappear. There is simply no need for "collapse" in a universe with no systems. Our experience of the classical reality does not apply to the universe as a whole, seen from the outside, but to the systems within it.
Moreover, terms like "observation", "correlation" and "interaction" will naturally make little sense without a division into systems. Zeh has suggested that the locality of the observer defines an observation in the sense that any observation arises from the ignorance of a part of the universe; and that this also defines the "facts" that can occur in a quantum system. Landsman (1995, pp. 45-46) argues similarly:
The essence of a "measurement", "fact" or "event" in quantum mechanics lies in the nonobservation, or irrelevance, of a certain part of the system in question. (. . . ) A world without parts declared or forced to be irrelevant is a world without facts.
However, the assumption of a decomposition of the universe into subsystems-as necessary as it appears to be for the emergence of the measurement problem and for the definition of the decoherence program-is definitely nontrivial. By definition, the universe as a whole is a closed system, and therefore there are no "unobserved degrees of freedom" of an external environment which would allow for the application of the theory of decoherence to determine the space of quasiclassical observables of the universe in its entirety. Also, there exists no general criterion for how the total Hilbert space is to be divided into subsystems, while at the same time much of what is attributed as a property of the system will depend on the correlation with other systems. This problem becomes particularly acute if one would like decoherence not only to motivate explanations for the subjective perception of classicality (like in Zurek's "existential interpretation", see Zurek, 1993 Zurek, , 1998 Zurek, , 2003a , and Sec. V.D.1 below), but moreover to allow for the definition of quasiclassical "macrofacts". Zurek (1998 Zurek ( , p. 1820 ) admits this severe conceptual difficulty:
In particular, one issue which has been often taken for granted is looming big, as a foundation of the whole decoherence program. It is the question of what are the "systems" which play such a crucial role in all the discussions of the emergent classicality. (. . . ) [A] compelling explanation of what are the systems-how to define them given, say, the overall Hamiltonian in some suitably large Hilbert space-would be undoubtedly most useful.
A frequently proposed idea is to abandon the notion of an "absolute" resolution and instead postulate the intrinsic relativity of the distinct state spaces and properties that emerge through the correlation between these relatively defined spaces (see, for example, the decoherenceunrelated proposals by Everett, 1957; Mermin, 1998a,b; Rovelli, 1996) . Maybe we should take the lesson learned from quantum entanglement-namely, to accept it as an intrinsic property of nature, and not view its counterintuitive, in the sense of nonclassical, implications as paradoxa that demand further resolution-as a signal that the relative view of systems and correlations is indeed a satisfactory path to take in order to arrive at a description of nature that is as complete and objective as the range of our experience (based on inherently local observations) allows for.
B. The concept of reduced density matrices
Since reduced density matrices are a key tool of decoherence, it will be worthwile to briefly review their basis properties and proper interpretation in the following.
The concept of reduced density matrices is tied to the beginnings of quantum mechanics (Furry, 1936; Landau, 1927; von Neumann, 1932;  for some historical remarks, see Pessoa Jr., 1998). It had been realized early in the context of a system of two entangled systems in a pure state of the EPR-type,
that for an observable O that pertains only to system 1, O = O 1 ⊗ I 2 , the pure-state density matrix ρ = |ψ ψ| yields, according to the trace rule O = Tr(ρ O) and given the usual Born rule for calculating probabilities, exactly the same statistics as the reduced density matrix ρ 1 that is obtained by tracing over the degrees of freedom of system 2 (i.e., the states |+ 2 and |− 2 ),
This result holds in general for any pure state
of a resolution of a system into N subsystems, where the {|φ i j } are assumed to form orthonormal basis sets in their respective Hilbert spaces H j , j = 1, . . . , N . For any observable O that pertains only to system j, O = I 1 ⊗ I 2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ I j−1 ⊗ O j ⊗ I j+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ I N , the statistics of O generated by applying the trace rule will be identical regardless whether we use the pure-state density matrix ρ = |ψ ψ| or the reduced density matrix
The typical situation in which the reduced density matrix arises is this. Before a premeasurement-type interaction, the observers knows that each individual system is in some (unknown) pure state. After the interaction, the observer has access to only one of the systems, say, system 1; everything that can be known about the state of the composite system must therefore be derived from measurements on system 1, which will yield the possible outcomes of system 1 and their probability distribution. All information that can be extracted by the observer is then, exhaustively and correctly, contained in the reduced density matrix of system 1, assuming that the Born rule for quantum probabilities holds.
Let us return to the EPR-type example, Eqs. (3.2) and (3.3). If we assume that the states of system 2 are orthogonal, 2 +|− 2 = 0, ρ 1 becomes diagonal,
But this density matrix is formally identical to the density matrix that would be obtained if system 1 was in a mixed state, i.e., in either one of the two states |+ 1 and |− 1 (with equal probabilties), and where it is a matter of ignorance in which state the system 1 is (which amounts to a classical, ignorance-interpretable, "proper" ensemble)-as opposed to the superposition |ψ , where both terms are considered present, which could in principle be confirmed by suitable interference experiments. This implies that a measurement of an observable that only pertains to system 1 can not discriminate between the two cases, pure vs. mixed state. 6
The formal identity of the reduced density matrix to a mixed-state density matrix (again assuming orthogonality of the "traced over" basis vectors) is easily misinterpreted as implying that the state of the system can be viewed as mixed too. But density matrices are only a calculational tool to compute the probability distribution for the set of possible outcomes of measurements; they do, however, not specify the state of the system. 7 The reduced density matrix looks like the density matrix describing the system as if it was in a mixed state because if one actually measured an observable of the system, one would expect to get a definite outcome with a certain probability (given by the Born rule, i.e., by the coefficients in front of the projection operators), which is, in terms of measurement statistics, equivalent to the situation where the system had been in one of the states from the set of possible outcomes from the beginning, that is, before the measurement. As Pessoa Jr. (1998, p. 432) puts it, "taking a partial trace amounts to the statistical version of the projection postulate". But without a nonunitary measurement interaction, the state of the total composite system is of course still pure, i.e., a superposition that must not (assuming that the e-e link holds) be interpreted as describing an ignorance-interpretable ensemble of states (d 'Espagnat, 1988) . We will return to these remarks when discussing the implications of the decoherence program (that makes, as remarked above, extensive use of the concept of reduced density matrices) for the measurement problem in Ch. IV.
C. A modified von Neumann measurement scheme
Let us reconsider the von Neumann model for (ideal) quantum mechanical measurement, Eq. (3.8), but now with the environment included. We shall denote the environment by E and represent its state before the measurement interaction by the initial state vector |e 0 in a Hilbert space H E . As usual, let us assume that the state space of the composite object system-apparatusenvironment is given by the tensor product of the individual Hilbert spaces, H S ⊗ H A ⊗ H E . The linearity of the Schrödinger equation then yields the following time evolution of the entire system SAE, n c n |s n |a r |e 0 (1) −→ n c n |s n |a n |e 0
(2) −→ n c n |s n |a n |e n , (3.8)
where the |e n are the states of the environment associated with the different pointer states |a n of the measuring apparatus. Note that while for two subsystems, say, S and A, there exists always a diagonal ("Schmidt") decomposition of the final state of the form n c n |s n |a n , for three subsystems (for example, S, A, and E), a decomposition of the form n c n |s n |a n |e n is not always possible. This implies that the operator that induces a time evolution of the above form, Eq. (3.8), must be of a very special form. 8 Typically, the |e n will be product states of (many) microsopic subsystem states |ε n i corresponding to the individual parts that form the environment, |e n = |ε n 1 |ε n 2 |ε n 3 · · · . We see that a nonseparable and in most cases, for all practical purposes, irreversible (due to the enormous number of degrees of freedom of the environment) correlation between the states of the systemapparatus combination SA with the different states of the environment E has been established.
Note that Eq. (3.8) implies that also the environment has recorded the state of the system (and, equivalently, the state of the system-apparatus composition), i.e., it acts as an amplifying (due to many subsystems that make up the environment) higher-order measuring device. The division into apparatus and environment is therefore somewhat arbitrary, but typically implied by the experimental situation, where the states of the apparatus are taken to represent the controlled and distinct key states of the physical measuring device (for example, macroscopic pointer positions: "1", "2", "3", . . . ), whereas the remaining (typically uncontrolled) degrees of freedom (microsopic positions of the atoms in the device, surrounding photons, etc.) are attributed to the environment. The actual registration of the measurement outcome by a (human) observer will in most cases require amplification and thus be based on an interaction with the environmental degrees of freedom that form a highly redundant representation of the state of the system.
D. Environment-induced superselection
We have discussed in Sec. II that the quantum mechanical measurement scheme as represented by Eq. (2.1) does not uniquely define the expansion of the postmeasurement state, and thereby leaves open the question which observable can be considered as having been measured by the apparatus. This situation is changed by the inclusion of the environment states in Eq. (3.8), for the following two reasons:
1. Environment-induced superselection of a preferred basis. The interaction between the apparatus and the environment singles out a set of mutually commuting observables.
2. The existence of a tridecompositional uniqueness theorem (Bub, 1997; Clifton, 1995; Elby and Bub, 1994) . If a state |ψ in a Hilbert space H 1 ⊗H 2 ⊗H 3 can be decomposed into the diagonal ("Schmidt") form |ψ = i α i |φ i 1 |φ i 2 |φ i 3 , the expansion is unique provided that the {|φ i 1 } and {|φ i 2 } are sets of linearly independent, normalized vectors in H 1 and H 2 , respectively, and that {|φ i 3 } is a set of mutually noncollinear normalized vectors in H 3 . This can be generalized to a N -decompositional uniqueness theorem, where N ≥ 3. Note that it is not always possible to decompose an arbitrary pure state of more than two systems (N ≥ 3) into the Schmidt form |ψ = i α i |φ i 1 |φ i 2 · · · |φ i N , but if the decomposition exists, its uniqueness is guaranteed.
The tridecompositional uniqueness theorem ensures that the expansion of the final state in Eq. (3.8) is unique, which fixes the ambiguity in the choice of the set of possible outcomes. It demonstrates that the inclusion of (at least) a third "system" (here referred to as the environment) is necessary to remove the basis ambiguity.
Of course, given any pure state in the composite Hilbert space H 1 ⊗ H 2 ⊗ H 3 , the tridecompositional uniqueness theorem tells us neither whether a Schmidt decomposition exists and nor does it specify the unique expansion itself (provided the decomposition is possible), and since the precise states of the environment are generally not known, an additional criterion is needed that determines what the preferred states will be.
Stability criterion and pointer basis
The decoherence program has attempted to define such a criterion based on the interaction with the environment and the idea of robustness and preservation of correlations. The environment thus plays a doubly rôle in suggesting a solution to the preferred basis problem: it selects a preferred pointer basis, and it guarantees its uniqueness via the tridecompositional uniqueness theorem.
In order to motivate the basis superselection approach proposed by the decoherence program, we note that in step (2) of Eq. (3.8), we have tacitly assumed that the interaction with the environment does not disturb the established correlation between the state of the system, |s n , and the corresponding pointer state |a n . This assumption can be viewed as a generalization of the concept of "faithful measurement" to the realistic case where the environment is included. Faithful measurement in the usual sense concerns step (1), namely, the requirement that the measuring apparatus A acts as a reliable "mirror" of the states of the system S by forming only correlations of the form |s n |a n but not |s m |a n where m = n. But since any realistic measurement process must include the inevitable coupling of the apparatus to its environment, the measurement could hardly be considered faithful as a whole if the interaction with the environment disturbed the correlations between the system and the apparatus. 9 It was therefore first suggested by Zurek (1981) to take the preferred pointer basis as the basis which "contains a reliable record of the state of the system S" (op. cit., p. 1519), i.e., the basis in which the system-apparatus correlations |s n |a n are left undisturbed by the subsequent formation of correlations with the environment ("stability criterion"). A sufficient criterion for dynamically stable pointer states that preserve the systemapparatus correlations in spite of the interaction of the apparatus with the environment is then found by requiring all pointer state projection operators P (A) n = |a n a n | to commute with the apparatus-environment interaction Hamiltonian H AE , i.e.,
This implies that any correlation of the measured system (or any other system, for instance an observer) with the eigenstates of a preferred apparatus observable,
is preserved, and that the states of the environment reliably mirror the pointer states P (A) n . In this case, the environment can be regarded as carrying out a nondemolition measurement on the apparatus. The commutativity requirement, Eq. (3.9), is obviously fulfilled if H AE is a function of O A , H AE = H AE ( O A ). Conversely, systemapparatus correlations where the states of the apparatus are not eigenstates of an observable that commutes with H AE will in general be rapidly destroyed by the interaction.
Put the other way around, this implies that the environment determines through the form of the interaction Hamiltonian H AE a preferred apparatus observable O A , Eq. (3.10), and thereby also the states of the system that are measured by the apparatus, i.e., reliably recorded through the formation of dynamically stable quantum correlations. The tridecompositional uniqueness theorem then guarantees the uniqueness of the expansion of the final state |ψ = n c n |s n |a n |e n (where no constraints on the c n have to be imposed) and thereby the uniqueness of the preferred pointer basis.
Besides the commutativity requirement, Eq. (3.9), other (yet similar) criteria have been suggested for the selection of the preferred pointer basis because it turns out that in realistic cases the simple relation of Eq. (3.9) can usually only be fulfilled approximately (Zurek, 1993; Zurek et al., 1993) . More general criteria, for example, based on the von Neumann entropy, −Trρ 2 Ψ (t) ln ρ 2 Ψ (t), or the purity, Trρ 2 Ψ (t), that uphold the goal of finding the most robust states (or the states which become least entangled with the environment in the course of the evolution), have therefore been suggested (Zurek, 1993 (Zurek, , 1998 (Zurek, , 2003a Zurek et al., 1993) . Pointer states are obtained by extremizing the measure (i.e., minimizing entropy, or maximizing purity, etc.) over the initial state |Ψ and requiring the resulting states to be robust when varying the time t. Application of this method leads to a ranking of the possible pointer states with respect to their "classicality" (i.e., their robustness with respect to the interaction with the environment) and thus allows for the selection of the preferred pointer basis based on the "most classical" pointer states ("predictability sieve"; see Zurek, 1993; Zurek et al., 1993) . Although the proposed criteria differ somewhat (and it is reasonable to assume that other meaningful criteria will be suggested in the future), it is hoped that in the macrosopic limit the resulting stable pointer states obtained from different criteria will turn out to be very similar (Zurek, 2003a) . For some toy models (in particular, for harmonic oscillator models that lead to coherent states as pointer states), this has already been verified explicitely (see Joos et al., 2003; L. Diósi and Kiefer, 2000 , and references therein).
Selection of quasiclassical properties
System-environment interaction Hamiltonians frequently describe a scattering process of surrounding par-ticles (photons, air molecules, etc.) with the system under study. Since the force laws describing such processes typically depend on some power of distance (such as ∝ r −2 in Newton's or Coulomb's force law), the interaction Hamiltonian will usually commute with the position basis, such that, according the commutativity requirement of Eq. (3.9), the preferred basis will be in position space. Thus the fact that position is frequently the determinate property of our experience can be explained by referring to the dependence of most interactions on distance (Zurek, 1981 (Zurek, , 1982 (Zurek, , 1991 .
This holds in particular for mesoscopic and macroscopic systems, as demonstrated for instance by the pioneering study by Joos and Zeh (1985) where surrounding photons and air molecules are shown to continuously "measure" the spatial structure of a dust molecule which leads to rapid decoherence into an apparent mixture of wavepackets that are sharply peaked in position space. 10 Similar results sometimes even hold for microscopic systems (that are usually found in energy eigenstates, see below) when they occur in distinct spatial structures that couple strongly to the surrounding medium. For instance, chiral molecules such as sugar are always observed to be in chirality eigenstates (left-handed and right-handed) which are superpositions of different energy eigenstates (Zeh, 1999a) . This is explained by the fact that the spatial structure of these molecules is continuously "monitored" by the environment (for example, through the scattering of air molecules) which leads to a much stronger coupling than could typically be achieved by a measuring device that was intended to, for example, measure parity or energy; furthermore, any attempt to prepare such molecules in energy eigenstates would lead to immediate decoherence into environmentally stable ("dynamically robust") chirality eigenstates, thus selecting position as the preferred basis and the determinate property.
On other hand, it is well-known that many systems, especially in the microsopic domain, are typically found in energy eigenstates, even if the interaction Hamiltonian depends on a different observable than energy, e.g., position. Paz and Zurek (1999) have shown that this situation arises when the frequencies dominantly present in the environment are significantly lower than the intrinsic frequencies of the system, that is, when the separation between the energy states of the system is greater than the largest energies available in the environment. Then, the environment will be only able to monitor quantities that are constants of motion. In the case of nondegeneracy, this will be energy, thus leading to the environmentinduced superselection of energy eigenstates for the system.
Another example for environment-induced superselection that has been studied is related to the fact that only eigenstates of the charge operator are observed, but never superpositions of different charges. The existence of the corresponding superselection rules was first only postulated (Wick et al., 1952 (Wick et al., , 1970 , but could subsequently be explained in the framework of decoherence by referring to the interaction of the charge with its own Coulomb (far) field which takes the rôle of the "environment", leading to immediate decoherence of charge superpositions into an apparent mixture of charge eigenstates (Giulini, 2000; Giulini et al., 1995) .
In general, three different cases have typically been distinguished (for example, in Paz and Zurek, 1999) for the kind of pointer observable emerging from the interaction with the environment, depending on the relative strengths of the self-Hamiltonian H S of the system and the system-environment interaction Hamiltonian H SE :
1. When the dynamics of the system are dominated by H SE , i.e., the interaction with the environment, the pointer states will be eigenstates of H SE (and thus typically eigenstates of position). This case corresponds to the typical quantum measurement setting as studied, for example, by Zurek (1981 Zurek ( , 1982 ; see also the outline in Sec. III.E.2 below.
2. When the interaction with the environment is weak and H S dominates the evolution of the system (namely, when the environment is "slow" in the above sense), a case that frequently occurs in the microscopic domain, pointer states will arise that are energy eigenstates of H S (Paz and Zurek, 1999) .
3. In the intermediate case, when the evolution of the system is governed by H SE and H S in roughly equal strength, the resulting preferred states will represent a "compromise" between the first two cases; for instance, the frequently studied model of quantum Brownian motion has shown the emergence of pointer states localized in phase space, i.e., in both position and momentum, for such a situation (Eisert, 2003; Joos et al., 2003; Unruh and Zurek, 1989; Zurek, 2003a; Zurek et al., 1993) .
In summary, although only particular examples have been studied (for a survey and references, see for example Blanchard et al., 2000; Joos et al., 2003; Zurek, 2003a) , the results suggest that for mesoscopic and macroscopic objects the distance-dependent interaction with surrounding air molecules, photons, etc., through scattering will in general lead to immediate decoherence into spatially localized wave packets and thus select position as the preferred basis. When the environment is comparably "slow", as it is frequently the case for microsopic systems, environment-induced superselection will typically yield energy eigenstates as the preferred states.
E. Decoherence and local suppression of interference
We now turn to the second main consequence of the interaction with the environment, namely, the vanishing of the diagonal terms in the local density matrix describing the probability distribution for the outcomes of measurements on the system. This effect has become known as environment-induced decoherence and it has frequently been claimed to imply an at least partial solution to the measurement problem.
Diagonality of the local density matrix from decoherence
We have already introduced the concept of local (or reduced) density matrices (see Sec. III.B) and have pointed out their interpretive caveats. In the context of the decoherence program, reduced density matrices arise as follows. Any observation will typically be restricted to the system-apparatus component, SA, while the many degrees of freedom of the environment E remain unobserved. Suppose therefore that the operator A SA represents an observable of SA only. Then its expectation value A SA is given by
where the density matrix ρ SAE of the total SAE combination,
( 3.12) has for all practical purposes of statistical predictions been replaced by the local (or reduced) density matrix ρ SA , obtained by "tracing out the unobserved degrees of the environment", that is,
c m c * n |s m |a m s n | a n | e n |e m .
(3.13) So far, ρ SA contains characteristic interference terms |s m |a m s n | a n |, where m = n, between different pointer positions since we cannot assume from the outset that the basis vectors |e m of the environment are necessarily mutually orthogonal, i.e., that e n |e m = 0 if m = n. Many explicit physical models for the interaction of a system with the environment (see the following Sec. III.E.2 for a simple example) have, however, shown that due to the large number of subsystems that compose the environment, the pointer states |e n of the environment rapidly approach orthogonality, e n |e m (t) → δ n,m , such that the reduced density matrix ρ SA becomes (approximately) orthogonal in the "pointer basis" {|a n }, that is,
Here, P (S) n and P (A) n are the projection operators onto the eigenstates of S and A, respectively. Therefore the interference terms have vanished in this local representation, i.e., phase coherence has been locally lost. This is precisely the effect referred to as environment-induced decoherence. The decohered local density matrices describing the probability distribution of the outcomes of a measurement on the system-apparatus combination is formally identical to the corresponding mixed-state density matrix, but again we must be careful in the proper interpretation of this state of affairs (see the discussion in Sec. III.B): full coherence is retained in the total density matrix ρ SAE , and therefore we cannot (must not) attach an ignorance interpretation to the decohered local density matrix, assuming, as usual, that quantum mechanics is not modified, in particular that the e-e link is upheld. We will come back to this issue in Ch. IV.
A simple model for decoherence of a two-state system
To illustrate how such decoherence effects arise, let us discuss a very simple model that was first introduced by Zurek (1982) . Consider a system S (which can be thought of representing the apparatus) with two spin states {|⇑ , |⇓ } that interacts with an environment E described by a collection of N other two-state spins {|↑ k , |↓ k }. The self-Hamiltonians H S and H E and the self-interaction Hamiltonian H EE of the environment are taken to be equal to zero. Only the interaction Hamiltonian H SE that describes the coupling of the spin of the system to the spins of the environment is assumed to be nonzero and of the form
(3.15) where g k are coupling constants. Applied to the initial state before the interaction is turned on, (3.16) this Hamiltonian yields a time evolution of the state given by
where the two environmental record states |E ⇑ (t) and
where the interference coefficient z(t) which determines the weight of the off-diagonal elements in the reduced density matrix is given by
and thus
At t = 0, z(t) = 1, i.e., the interference terms are fully present, as expected. If |α k | 2 = 0 or 1 for each k, i.e., if the environment is in an eigenstate of the interaction Hamiltonian H SE of the type |↑ 1 |↑ 2 |↓ 3 · · · |↑ N , and/or if 2g k t = mπ (m = 0, 1, . . .), then z(t) 2 ≡ 1 so coherence is retained over time. However, under realistic circumstances, we can typically assume a random distribution of the initial states of the environment (i.e., of coefficients α k , β k ) and of the coupling coefficients g k , such that for large N , where sin 2 2g k t E ≃ 1/2,
so the off-diagonal terms in the reduced density matrix become strongly damped. Detailed model calculations, where the environment is typically represented by a more sophisticated model consisting of a collection of harmonic oscillators (Caldeira and Leggett, 1983; Hu et al., 1992; Joos et al., 2003; Unruh and Zurek, 1989; Zurek, 2003a; Zurek et al., 1993) , have shown that the dampening occurs on extremely short decoherence time scales τ D that are typically many orders of magnitude shorter than the thermal relaxation. Even microscopic systems such as large molecules are rapidly decohered by the interaction with thermal radiation on a time scale that is for all matters of practical observation much shorter than any observation could resolve; for mesoscopic systems such as dust particles, the 3K cosmic microwave background radiation is sufficient to yield strong and immediate decoherence (Joos and Zeh, 1985; Zurek, 1991) . Within τ D , |z(t)| approaches zero and remains close to zero, fluctuating with an average standard deviation of the random-walk type σ ∼ √ N (Zurek, 1982) . However, the multiple periodicity of z(t) implies that coherence and thus purity of the reduced density matrix will reappear after a certain time τ r , which can be shown to be very long and of the Poincaré type with τ r ∼ N !. For macroscopic environments of realistic but finite sizes, τ r can exceed the lifetime of the universe (Zurek, 1982) , but nevertheless always remains finite.
From a conceptual point, recurrence of coherence is of little relevance. The recurrence time could only be infinitely long in the hypothetical case of an infinitely large environment; in this situation, off-diagonal terms in the reduced density matrix would be irreversibly damped and lost in the limit t → ∞, which has sometimes been regarded as describing a physical collapse of the state vector (Hepp, 1972) . But neither is the assumption of infinite sizes and times ever realized in nature (Bell, 1975) , nor can information ever be truly lost (as achieved by a "true" state vector collapse) through unitary time evolution-full coherence is always retained at all times in the total density matrix ρ SAE (t) = |ψ(t) ψ(t)|.
We can therefore state the general conclusion that, except for exceptionally well isolated and carefully prepared microsopic and mesoscopic systems, the interaction of the system with the environment causes the off-diagonal terms (interference terms) of the local density matrix expressed in the pointer basis (which describes the probability distribution of the possible outcomes of a measurement on the system) to become extremely small in a very short period of time, and that this process is irreversible for all practical purposes.
F. Pointer basis vs. instantaneous Schmidt states
The so-called "Schmidt basis", obtained by diagonalizing the (reduced) density matrix of the system at each instant t, has been frequently studied with respect to its ability to yield a preferred basis (see, for example, Albrecht, 1992 Albrecht, , 1993 Zeh, 1973) , having led some to consider the Schmidt basis states as describing "instantaneous pointer states" (Albrecht, 1992) . However, as it has been emphasized (for example, by Zurek, 1993) , any density matrix is diagonal in some basis, and this basis will in general not play any special interpretive rôle. Pointer states that are supposed to correspond to quasiclassical stable observables must be derived from an explicit criterion for classicality (typically, the stability criterion); the simple mathematical diagonalization procedure of the instantaneous density matrix will generally not suffice to determine a quasiclassical pointer basis (see the studies by Barvinsky and Kamenshchik, 1995; Kent and McElwaine, 1997) .
In a more refined method, one refrains from computing instantaneous Schmidt states, and instead allows for a characteristic decoherence time τ D to pass during which the reduced density matrix decoheres (a process described by an appropriate master equation) and becomes approximately diagonal in the stable pointer basis (i.e., the basis that is selected by the stability criterion), and then calculate the Schmidt states of this decohered density matrix. Since decoherence will usually achieve rapid diagonality of the reduced density matrix to a very good approximation, the resulting Schmidt basis will then typically be very similar to the stability-selected pointer basis except in the case of degeneracy. The latter situation is easily illustrated by considering the approximately di-agonal decohered density matrix (Albrecht, 1993) 
where |ω| ≪ 1 (strong decoherence) and δ ≪ 1 (neardegeneracy). If decoherence led to exact diagonality (i.e., ω = 0), the eigenstates would be, for any fixed value of δ, proportional to (0, 1) and (1, 0) (corresponding to the "ideal" pointer states). However, for fixed ω > 0 (approximate diagonality) and δ → 0 (degeneracy), the eigenstates become proportional to (± |ω| ω , 1), which implies that in the case of degeneracy the Schmidt decomposition of the reduced density matrix can yield preferred states that are very different from the stable pointer states, even if the decohered, rather than the instantaneous, reduced density matrix is diagonalized.
In summary, it is important to emphasize that stability (or a similar criterion) is the relevant requirement for the emergence of a preferred quasiclassical basis, which can in general not be achieved by simply diagonalizing the instantaneous reduced density matrix. However, the eigenstates of the decohered reduced density matrix will in many situations (except in the case of high degeneracy) approximate the quasiclassical stable pointer states well.
G. Envariance, quantum probabilities and the Born rule
In the following, we shall briefly review and discuss an approach towards the derivation the Born rule that has recently been suggested by Zurek (2003a,b,c) . A more detailed analysis of Zurek's argument can be found in Schlosshauer and Fine (2003) . We include a discussion of this proposal here for two reasons. First, Zurek's derivation is based on the inclusion of an "environment" E (entangled with the system S of interest to which we wish to assign probabilities), thus matching well the spirit of decoherence. Second, the decoherence program relies heavily on the trace operation, cf. Eq. (3.11), which presumes Born's rule. As much as decoherence might be capable of explaining the emergence of subjective classicality from quantum mechanics, a remaining loophole in a consistent derivation of classicality (including a motivation for some of the axioms of quantum mechanics, as suggested by Zurek, 2003a) has been tied to the fact that the Born rule needs to be postulated separately. Note also that decoherence itself cannot be used to derive the Born rule (as, for example, tried in the proposal by Zurek, 1998) because otherwise the argument would be rendered circular (Zeh, 1996) . In an attempt to close this loophole, Zurek (2003a,b,c) tries to motivate the emergence of quantum probabilities and the Born rule from quantum mechanics alone, by means of a mechanism termed environmentassisted invariance, or "envariance".
There have been various attempts in the past to replace the postulate of the Born rule by a derivation. Gleason's (1957) theorem has shown that if one imposes the condition that for any orthonormal basis of a given Hilbert space the sum of the probabilities associated with each basis vector must add up to one, the Born rule is the only possibility for the calculation of probabilities. Because Gleason's proof provides little insight into the physical meaning of the Born probabilities, various other attempts have been made towards a derivation of the Born rule (see, for example, Deutsch, 1999; DeWitt, 1971; Everett, 1957; Farhi and Goldstone, 1989; Geroch, 1984; Graham, 1973; Hartle, 1968 ), but the validity of these proofs has been questioned (Barnum et al., 2000; Kent, 1990; Squires, 1990; Stein, 1984) . Deutsch's (1999) proposal has, however, recently been defended by Wallace (2003b) and put into an operational framework by Saunders (2002).
Schmidt states, outcomes and dependence of probabilities
In Zurek's approach, quantum probabilities and the Born rule are claimed to arise from a study of the properties of the composite pure Schmidt state
( 3.24) living in the tensor product space H S ⊗ H E and describing entanglement between a system S and its environment E, under a certain class of unitary transformations, namely, so-called "envariant transformations". Zurek assumes that after the entanglement has been established, S and E are dynamically decoupled. Note that any composite pure state describing entanglement between two systems can be expressed in the diagonal Schmidt form.
If the composite state is initially nonpure, it can be "purified" by enlarging the Hilbert space H E . So the choice of the Schmidt state as the starting point of the derivation will not imply a restriction on the generality of the argument. Of course, the initial necessity for the inclusion of an environment to derive probabilities for the system might be viewed as somewhat restrictive, but on the other hand we can argue that probabilities are only relevant in the context of measurements which anyway require the openness of systems (and thus a decomposition of the total Hilbert space) to describe a measurement-like interaction between the system and the observer. What are the "events" the derivation tries to assign probabilities to? Here, Zurek implicitely assumes the e-e link by stating that the aim of his approach is to derive probabilities for the "events {|s k }" (Zurek, 2003c, p. 12) , i.e., the probability for the occurrence of a particular value of the measured physical quantity is directly identified with the probability for an eigenstate of the measured observable with an eigenvalue identical to the measured value.
Zurek's derivation also assumes that the probabilities that an observer of S can assign to the "events" {|s k } are only dependent on the local properties of S (i.e., all the properties of S that can be measured by an observer who has only access to S). These local properties are in turn assumed to be a function of the composite state vector |ψ SE only, that is, the information contained in |ψ SE (and available to a local observer of S) suffices to completely specify the probabilities.
For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we will restrict ourselves to an outline of the derivation for a composite Schmidt state with coefficients of equal magnitude and only two basis states {|s 1 , |s 2 } of H S and {|e 1 , |e 2 } of H E (i.e., two-dimensional Hilbert spaces H S and H E ):
Once a valid derivation of the Born rule is accomplished for this state, the generalization to coefficients of different magnitude can be done by application of a standard counting argument (Zurek, 2003b) ; the extension to higher-dimensional Hilbert spaces H S and H E is straightforward.
Envariance under phase shifts and swaps
Zurek now asks the following question: Given the composite state |ψ SE , Eq. (3.24), of the SE combination, what properties can be ascribed to the individual parts S and E? To this extent, Zurek considers a unitary transformation U S that only acts on the system S, i.e., a transformation of the form U S = u S ⊗ I E , where I E is the identity operator in the Hilbert space H E of E. If the transformation U S acting on the composite state |ψ SE can be undone by a second unitary transformation U E = I S ⊗ u E that only acts on the environment E, such that the original state |ψ SE is restored, i.e., U E U S |ψ SE = |ψ SE , the composite state |ψ SE is called "envariant under u S ". A property that is transformed by an envariant transformation is called "envariant" as well and interpreted as not "belonging" to S alone, since the transformation can be undone by acting on E.
Zurek considers two types of envariant transformations: phase shifts and so-called "swaps". Phase shifts are of the form
(3.25), the phases of the Schmidt coefficients are modified:
(3.28) As the reader may easily verify, the original state |ψ SE can be recovered by subsequently acting on
. Therefore the phases of the Schmidt coefficients are an envariant property of SE and can therefore not belong to S alone. A local description of S can thus not depend on the phases ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 in Eq. (3.25), and we can instead use the state
in the remainder of the argument. The second kind of envariant transformations are "swaps" that interchange the correlations between the |s k and |e k . The transformation is given by
. The property of a particular correlation between an |e l and an |s k is therefore envariant; hence, it cannot belong to S alone, i.e., it is not part of the locally measurable properties of S.
Envariant transformations of probabilities
Now, Zurek's derivation tries to connect envariance of |ψ SE under swaps with probabilities via the following argument (Zurek, 2003b, p. 120404-2) :
Let us now make a rather general (and a bit pedantic) assumption about the measuring process: When the states are swapped, the corresponding probabilities get relabeled (i ↔ j). This leads us to conclude that the probabilities for any two envariantly swappable |s k are equal.
Zurek has tried to motivate this statement in personal correspondence with the present author as follows. Let us denote the probability for the "outcome" |s 1 by p(|s 1 ; |ψ SE ) (and similarly for |s 2 , |e 1 and |e 2 ), where the second argument of the probability function reflects Zurek's assumption that all information required to specify probabilities is contained in the composite state vector |ψ SE . Zurek then states the following chain of relations for the behavior of the probabilities under the application of a swap and a subsequent counterswap:
(i) Initially,
Zurek infers this relation from the form of the direct products |s 1 |e 1 and |s 2 |e 2 in the state |ψ SE , Eq. (3.29). However, without running into the danger of presupposing the Born rule (from which Eq. (3.33) would of course trivially follow based on the formalism of state space projections), Eq. (3.33) must clearly be considered as an assumption in Zurek's derivation. In fact, it is via Eq. (3.33) that probabilities are introduced into the derivation for the first time. The necessity for an assumption at this point can then be traced back to a fundamental statement about any probabilitic theory, namely, that at some stage one always needs to explicitely add in a probability concept into the otherwise nonprobabilistic theory.
(ii) After applying the S-swap operation,
from Eq. (3.30), the probabilities are given by
(3.34) (iii) Zurek now makes the important claim that the probabilities associated with E cannot have been influenced by the envariant swap acting on S since locally measurable properties of E (which the probabilities of E are assumed to be solely dependent on) cannot have been affected by this swap:
We shall comment on this crucial step below.
(iv) After applying the E-counterswap,
(3.36) (v) Employing a reasoning analogous to that of step (3), Zurek now holds that
(3.37) (vi) Finally, since the counterswap has restored the original state |ψ SE , Zurek states that
and therefore obtain the desired result of equal likelihoods for |s 1 and |s 2 , i.e., p(|s 1 ; |ψ SE ) = p(|s 2 ; |ψ SE ). However, the justification for steps (iii) and (v) is not clear to the present author. It appears that the reasoning requires knowledge about the behavior of the probabilities under envariant transformations. Envariance of |ψ SE implies that the probabilities cannot depend on which |e l is correlated with a particular |s k , but this state of affairs does not seem to force out the conclusion that acting with the swap transformation on S cannot have disturbed the probabilities for the E-outcomes (and vice versa). Swapping requires an undoing of the existing correlations between S and E and a formation of new correlations. It might well be questioned why "doing something" to S or E (even if, as in the case of swaps, it can be induced by local interactions with either S or E) should not influence the "guess" an observer of E (or S) would make concerning the outcomes associated with E (or S). Therefore we read the steps (iii) and (v) as an additional assumption, namely, that envariant transformations of the form U S = u S ⊗ I E and U E = I S ⊗ u E (in particular swaps) do not disturb the probabilities of the E-outcomes and S-outcomes, respectively.
In summary, we have identified four important assumptions that Zurek's derivation is based on (but that have not been explicitely stated by Zurek):
(1) Probabilities of S-outcomes and E-outcomes are a function of the locally measurable properties of S and E only; these properties are solely dependent on the composite state vector |ψ SE .
(2) The e-e link holds.
(3) For an entangled Schmidt state of the form
probabilities of E-outcomes and S-outcomes, respectively. Although the necessity for these assumptions seems to render the character of the Zurek's derivation less fundamental, we can nevertheless consider the proposal as providing a very promising motivation for the emergence of probabilities and the Born rule in quantum mechanics. The author hopes that having pointed out the above assumptions will help in further evaluations of Zurek's argument in the future.
A "subjective" observer-based argument for Born's rule
For the sake of completeness, we should also mention a different line of reasoning given by Zurek (2003a,c) regarding the emergence of equal likelihoods for the Soutcomes when SE is in the composite state |ψ SE of Eq. (3.25):
(1) Probabilities are identified with the "guess the observer makes on the basis of his information before the measurement about the state of his memory-the future outcome-after the measurement" (Zurek, 2003a, p. 755 ).
(2) An observer who knows the composite state |ψ SE exactly must be completely ignorant of the individual state of S.
(3) Since |ψ SE is envariant under swaps and the observer of S can therefore not detect the swapping by local measurements, the observer regards all potential outcomes as equally probable.
There are two concerns regarding this argument. First, how can exact knowledge of |ψ SE be established if the observer has only access to S? In particular, how does he arrive at a description of the composite state by coefficients of equal magnitude? 11 Second, it is difficult to see why envariance under swaps should make the observer conclude that all the potential outcomes {|s k } must be equally likely. Therefore Zurek's alternative argument as presented in the steps (1)-(3) above appears to require further justification to go through.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECOHERENCE FOR THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM
As it should have become clear from the survey of the decoherence program in the previous Sec. III, both environment-induced superselection of preferred observables and local suppression of interference through decoherence are related to the measurement problem; accordingly, they have been claimed in various places to provide a partial or full solution of this problem, while explicit rebuttals of such claims seem to have been given equally frequently. Two main questions need to be considered: Do the environment-derived criteria for the selection of a preferred pointer basis lead to physically meaningful results of sufficient generality? And second, how is one to interpret the local suppression of interference in spite of the fact that full coherence is retained in the total state of the system-environment combination?
A popular reading of the decoherence program goes as follows:
(1) The interaction of the system with the environment selects a preferred basis, i.e., a particular set of quasi-classical robust states, that commute, at least approximately, with the Hamiltonian governing the system-environment interaction. Since the form of interaction Hamiltonians usually depends on familiar "classical" quantities-in particular, distance (i.e., position)-the preferred states will typically also belong to the small set of "classical" properties.
(2) Decoherence then quickly damps superpositions between the localized preferred states when only the system is considered. This is taken as an explanation of the appearance of a "classical" world of determinate, "objective" (in the sense of robustness)
properties to a local observer.
The tempting interpretation of these achievements is then to conclude that this accounts for the observation of unique (via environment-induced superselection) and definite (via decoherence) pointer states at the end of the measurement, and the measurement problem appears to be solved at least for all practical purposes.
However, the crucial difficulty in the above reasoning consists of justifying step (2). Destruction of (local) interference solely means that there exists a set of individually localized components of the wave function. But to explain the existence (when an "objective" solution to the measurement problem is sought) or at least the subjective perception of single outcomes, we need to impose an interpretive rule that explains why only one of the localized states is realized and/or perceived. Standard "orthodox" quantum mechanics does not contain such a rule; to the contrary, its own rule that allows for the ascription of outcomes, namely, the e-e link, prohibits the assumption that only one of the components is realized since the total post-decoherence system-environment combination is still described by a coherent pure-state superposition. Thus alternative interpretive approaches are required to solve this part of the measurement problem. This point will be discussed in more detail in Sec. IV.B below. Prior to that, we shall in the following Sec. IV.A assess to what extent an appeal to decoherence justifies step (1) above, i.e., the suggestion that decoherence solves the preferred basis problem.
A. Does decoherence solve the preferred basis problem?
The idea of the decoherence program that the preferred basis is selected by the requirement that correlations must be preserved in spite of the interaction with the environment, and thus chosen through the form of the system-environment interaction Hamiltonian, seems certainly reasonable, since only such "robust" states will in general be observable-and after all we only demand an explanation for our experience (see the discussion in Sec. II.B.3). The toy models studied so far have confirmed that the thus selected properties are in accordance with our observation.
The clear merit of this approach lies in the fact that the preferred basis is not chosen in an ad hoc manner as to simply make our measurement records determinate or as to plainly match our experience of which physical quantities are usually perceived as determinate (for example, position), but that instead the selection is motivated on physical, observer-free grounds, namely, through the system-environment interaction Hamiltonian: the vast space of possible quantum mechanical superpositions is reduced so much because the laws governing physical interactions depend only on a few physical quantities (position, momentum, charge, and the like), and the fact that precisely these are the properties that appear determinate to us is explained by the dependence of the preferred basis on the form of the interaction. The appearance of "classicality" is therefore grounded in the structure of the physical laws-certainly a highly satisfying and reasonable approach.
The above argument in favor of the approach of environment-induced superselection could of course be considered as somewhat circular on a fundamental level: all physical laws are discovered and formulated by us, so they can solely contain the determinate quantities of our experience because these are the only quantities we can perceive and thus include into physical laws. Thus the derivation of determinacy from our physical laws might seem circular. However, we shall argue again that it suffices to demand a subjective solution to the preferred basis problem-that is, to provide an answer to the question why we perceive only such a small subset of properties as determinate, not whether there really are determinate properties (on an ontological level) and what they are (cf. the remarks in Sec. II.B.3).
We might also worry about the generality of this approach. One would need to show that any such environment-induced superselection leads in fact to precisely those properties that appear determinate to us. But this would require the precise knowledge of the system and interaction Hamiltonian. For simple toy models, the relevant Hamiltonians can be written down explicitely. In more complicated and realistic cases, this will in general be very difficult, if not impossible, since the form of the Hamiltonian will depend on the particular system or apparatus and the monitoring environment under consideration, where in addition the environment is not only difficult to precisely define, but also constantly changing, uncontrollable and in essence infinitely large.
But the situation is not as hopeless as it might sound, since we know that the interaction Hamiltonian will in general be based on the set of known physical laws which in turn employ only a relatively small number of physical quantities. So as long as we assume the stability criterion and consider the set of known physical quantities as complete, we can automatically anticipate the preferred basis to be a member of this set. The remaining, yet very relevant, question is then, however, which subset of these properties will be chosen in a specific physical situation (for example, will the system preferably be found in an eigenstate of energy or position?), and to what extent this matches the experimental evidence. To give an answer, a more detailed knowledge of the interaction Hamiltonian (and its relative strength with respect to the self-Hamiltonian of the system) will usually be necessary in order to verify the approach. Besides, as mentioned in Sec. III.D, there exist other criteria than the commutativity requirement, and it is not at all fully explored whether they all lead to the same determinate properties.
Finally, a fundamental conceptual difficulty of the decoherence-based approach to the preferred basis problem is the lack of a general criterion for what defines the systems and the "unobserved" degrees of freedom of the "environment" (see the discussion in Sec. III.A). While in many laboratory-type situations, the division into system and environment might arise naturally, it is not clear a priori how quasiclassical observables can be defined through environment-induced superselection on a larger and more general scale, i.e., when larger parts of the universe are considered where the split into subsystems is not suggested by some specific systemapparatus-surroundings setup.
To summarize, environment-induced superselection of a preferred basis (i) proposes an explanation why a particular pointer basis gets chosen at all (namely, by arguing that it is only the pointer basis that leads to stable, and thus perceivable, records when the interaction of the apparatus with the environment is taken into account), and (ii) it argues that the preferred basis will be a subset of the set of the determinate properties of our experience (since the governing interaction Hamiltonian will solely depend on these quantities). But it does not tell us (in general) what the pointer basis will precisely be for any given physical situation (since it will usually be hardly possible to explicitely write down the relevant interaction Hamiltonian in realistic cases). This also entails that it will in general be difficult to argue that any proposed criterion based on the interaction with the environment will always and in all generality lead to exactly those properties that we perceive as determinate.
Much work remains therefore to be done to fully explore the general validity and applicability of the approach of environment-induced superselection. But since the results obtained thus far from toy models have been found to be in promising agreement with empirical data, there is little reason to doubt that the decoherence program has proposed a very valuable criterion to explain the smallness of the perceived Hilbert state space and the robustness of the selected states; the fact that the approach is derived from physical principles should be counted additionally in its favor.
B. Does decoherence solve the problem of outcomes?
Standard "orthodox" quantum mechanics
The interpretive rule of orthodox quantum mechanics that tells us when we can speak of outcomes is given by the e-e link. It is an "objective" criterion since it allows us to infer when we can consider the system to be in a definite state to which a value of a physical quantity can be ascribed. Within this interpretive framework, decoherence cannot solve the problem of outcomes, since the density matrix of the SAE combination (i.e., system plus apparatus plus environment) retains full coherence throughout time because of its purely unitary evolution, which prohibits the ascription of a single outcome to the system (unless of course the composite system is in an eigenstate of the observable). Much of the criticism directed against decoherence with respect to its ability of solving the measurement problem has been centered around this argument.
Let us elaborate on this point in more detail. The diagonalized reduced density matrix, Eq. (3.14), together with the trace relation, Eq. (3.11), implies that for all practical purposes the statistics of the system SA will be indistinguishable from that of a proper mixture (ensemble) by any local observation on SA. That is, given (i) the trace rule A = Tr( ρ A) and (ii) the interpretation of A as the expectation value of an observable A, the expectation value of any observable A SA restricted to the local system SA will be FAPP identical to the expectation value of this observable if SA had been in one of the states |s n |a n (i.e., as if SA was described by an ensemble of states). In other words, decoherence has effectively removed any interference terms (such as |s m |a m a n | s n | where m = n) from the calculation of the trace Tr( ρ SA A SA ), and thereby from the calculation of the expectation value A SA . It is therefore claimed that formal equivalence-i.e., the fact that decoherence transforms the reduced density matrix into a form identical to that of a density matrix representing an ensemble of pure states-yields observational equivalence in the sense above, i.e., (local) indistiguishability of the expectation values derived from these two types of density matrices via the trace rule.
But we must be careful in interpreting the correspondence between the mathematical formalism (such as the trace rule) and the common terms employed in describing "the world". In quantum mechanics, the identification of the expression "Tr(ρA)" as the expectation value of a quantity relies on the mathematical fact that when writing out this trace, it is found to be equal to a sum over the possible outcomes of the measurement, weighted by the Born probabilities for the system to be "thrown" into a particular state corresponding to each of these outcomes in the course of a measurement-and thus well corresponding to our common-sense intuition about the meaning of expectation values as the sum over possible values that can appear in a given measurement, multiplied by the relative frequency of actual occurrence of these values in a series of such measurements. This interpretation however presumes (i) that measurements have outcomes, (ii) that measurements lead to definite "values", and (iii) the identification of measurable physical quantities as operators (observables) in a Hilbert space, together with (iv) the interpretation of the modulus square of the expansion coefficients of the state in terms of the eigenbasis of the observable as representing probabilities of actual measurement outcomes (Born probabilities).
But we have seen that phase coherence between macroscopically different pointer states is preserved in the state that includes the environment-and we can always enlarge the system such as to include (at least parts of) the environment. In other words, the superposition of different pointer positions still exists, coherence is only "delocalized into the larger system" (Kiefer and Joos, 1998, p. 5) , i.e., into the environment-or, as Joos and Zeh (1985, p. 224 ) put it, "the interference terms still exist, but they are not there"-and the process of decoherence could at least in principle always be reversed. Therefore, if we assume the e-e link, decoherence cannot ensure that the measuring device actually ever is in a definite pointer state (unless, of course, the system S is initially in an eigenstate of the observable), i.e., that measurements have outcomes at all.
As already pointed out in our general discussion of reduced density matrices in Sec. III.B, the e-e link also implies that the reduced diagonalized density matrix ρ d SA , Eq. (3.14), only represents an improper ensemble which is not ignorance-interpretable (d 'Espagnat, 1988) . The tempting interpretation of the coefficients |c n | 2 in Eq. (3.14) as classical probabilities-i.e., as the fraction of systems that would be in the state |s n |a n if we had an infinite set of such systems-is not allowed, since the components in the sum of Eq. (3.14) do not correspond to individual well-defined states. Note that with respect to the post-measurement state vector of the total system, given by the final step in Eq. (3.8), the interaction with environment has solely led to additional entanglement, but it has not transformed the state vector in any way (as it would be required to assign a single outcome according to the e-e link), since the rapidly evolving orthogonality of the states of the environment associated with the different pointer positions have not entered into the state description at all. Only once we form the local pure-state density matrix ρ SA , Eq. (3.13), this orthogonality can have an effect, namely, by dynamically evolving ρ SA into the improper ensemble ρ d SA , Eq. (3.14). Also note that since any nonpure density matrix can be rewritten in infinitely many ways, the reduced density matrix does not give a probability distribution of states but is only a calculational tool to determine the probability distribution of the possible outcomes of a measurement represented by a presupposed local operator observable.
Therefore the suppression of interference alone cannot justify the claim that only one of the decohered outcome states is actually realized; in fact, any assumption derived from the local suppression of interference that a particular outcome has occured must be considered inconsistent with the persistence of coherence in the total state that prohibits the ascription of a single outcome according to the e-e link. Decoherence brings about an apparent mixture of states that are precisely those that we perceive as determinate (a great achievement of the programnamely, of the approach of environment-induced superselection), and our observation tells us that this apparent mixture indeed appears like a proper ensemble in a measurement situation, as we observe that measurements lead to the "realization" of precisely one state in the ensemble. But on the basis of standard quantum mechanics with the e-e link, decoherence cannot explain this crucial step from an apparent mixture to the existence and/or perception of single outcomes.
Starkly put, the ubiquitous entanglement brought about by the interaction with the environment could even be considered as making the measurement problem worse. Bacciagaluppi (2003a, Sec. 3 .
2) puts it like this:
Intuitively, if the environment is carrying out, without our intervention, lots of approximate position measurements, then the measurement problem ought to apply more widely, also to these spontaneously occurring measurements. (. . . ) The state of the object and the environment could be a superposition of zillions of very well localised terms, each with slightly different positions, and which are collectively spread over a macroscopic distance, even in the case of everyday objects. (. . . ) If everything is in interaction with everything else, everything is entangled with everything else, and that is a worse problem than the entanglement of measuring apparatuses with the measured probes.
So while the interaction with the environment and the resulting decoherence effects are capable of leading to classically narrow individual components of the wave function, we clearly (and urgently) need a further interpretive approach that explains why only one of these components is actually realized and/or perceived in order to solve the measurement problem.
Alternative interpretive approaches
As pointed out before, the e-e link is by no means forced upon us by the structure of quantum mechanics (Bub, 1997) . Hence we can embed the results decoherence gives rise to into a different interpretive framework that connects the set of decohered localized states with the emergence of "objectively existing" or "subjectively perceived" outcomes. 12 If one wants to accomplish this goal without introducing new elements into the quantum theory and instead establish a very "literal" reading of the quantum mechanical formalism, one will most commonly advocate a relative-state view as introduced by Everett (1957). Environment-induced decoherence and superselection can then be used to define temporally extended noninterfering "branches" (corresponding 12 One might raise the question whether the fact that full coherence is retained in the composite state of the system-environment combination could ever lead to empirical conflicts with the ascription of definite values to (mesoscopic and macroscopic) systems in some alternative interpretive approach. After all, one could think of enlarging the system as to include the environment such that measurements could now actually reveal the persisting quantum coherence even on a macroscopic level. However, Zurek (1982) has pointed out that such measurements could not be carried out in practice, a statement that was supported by a simple model calculation by Omnès (1992, p. 356 ) for a macrosopic body (with 10 24 degrees of freedom).
to the different "outcomes") of the universal state vector to which distinct states of the observer are attached through the interaction with the system. A local observer can therefore perceive single outcomes in spite of the persistence of coherence in the global state, thus suggesting a subjective solution to the problem of outcomes. This view has for some time been promoted, for example, by Zurek (1993 Zurek ( , 1998 Zurek ( , 2003a and his "existential interpretation" that attempts to explain the measurement-related postulates of quantum mechanics (the projection postulate, the e-e link, the Born rule for quantum probabilities) as arising from within such a subjective relativestate view when the interaction with the environment and decoherence is taken into account. Other types of interpretations, for instance modal interpretations, that abandon the e-e link and use a different rule to ascribe definite values of physical quantities to quantum systems, can similarly benefit from environment-induced selection and decoherence in arriving at a consistent and empirically adequate solution to the measurement problem.
A balanced evaluation of decoherence in the context of the measurement problem should therefore not only consider the case of standard quantum mechanics with its somewhat "restrictive" e-e link discussed above (that must automatically dismiss any proposals towards a solution of the definiteness problem that are solely based on unitary dynamics), but should also include alternative approaches that "let go" of the e-e link (that aims at ensuring objective definiteness) and employ decoherence effects to suggest an alternative (subjective or objective) solution to the definiteness problem. To accomodate this goal, we shall explore, in the following Sec. V, the implications of the decoherence program for alternative interpretive approaches and the ability of these proposals to solve the measurement problem when decoherence effects are considered.
V. THE RÔLE OF DECOHERENCE IN INTERPRETATIONS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
It was not until the early 1970s that the importance of the interaction of physical systems with their natural environment for a realistic quantum mechanical description of these systems was realized and a proper viewpoint on such interactions was established (Zeh, 1970 (Zeh, , 1973 . It took another decade to allow for a first concise formulation of the theory of decoherence (Zurek, 1981 (Zurek, , 1982 and for numerical studies that showed the ubiquity and effectiveness of decoherence effects (Joos and Zeh, 1985) . Of course, by that time, several main positions in interpreting quantum mechanics had already been established, for example the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm (Bohm, 1952) , Everett-style relative-state interpretations (Everett, 1957) , and what had been introduced by van Fraassen (1973 van Fraassen ( , 1991 as the modal interpretation, which is now viewed as describing a fairly broad class of interpretive strategies.
After the importance of decoherence effects for the proper quantum mechanical description of physical systems was realized by (parts of) the scientific community, decoherence provided a motivation to look afresh at the existing interpretations and to introduce changes and extensions to these interpretations as well as to propose new interpretations. Some of the central questions in this context were, and still are: 1. Can decoherence by itself solve certain foundational issues at least FAPP such as to make certain interpretive additives superfluous? What are then the crucial remaining foundational problems?
2. Can decoherence protect an interpretation from empirical falsification?
3. Conversely, can decoherence provide a mechanism to exclude an interpretive strategy as incompatible with quantum mechanics and/or as empirically inadequate?
4. Can decoherence physically motivate some of the assumptions on which an interpretation is based, and give them a more precise meaning?
5. Can decoherence serve as an amalgam that unifies and simplifies a spectrum of different interpretations?
These and other questions have been widely discussed, both in the context of particular interpretations and with respect to general implications for interpretations of quantum mechanics. Especially interpretations that uphold the universal validity of the unitary Schrödinger time evolution, most notably Everett-type and modal interpretations, have frequently incorporated environmentinduced superselection of a preferred basis and decoherence into their framework. It is the purpose of this section to critically investigate the implications of environment-induced superselection and decoherence for existing interpretations of quantum mechanics, with an particular emphasis on discussing the questions outlined above. We have classified the interpretations according to their strategies employed in solving the measurement problem, as outlined in the Introduction: type-1 (modifying the measurement formalism), type-2 (modifying the time evolution), and type-3 (modifying the eigenvalue-eigenstate link).
A. General implications of decoherence for interpretations
We shall briefly outline what potential rôle the decoherence effects described in Sec. III may play in interpretations of quantum mechanics.
a. Selection of a preferred basis. Most interpretations of quantum mechanics suffer, to a different degree, from the preferred basis problem since they typically abandon the special "orthodox" rôle of the external observer as the selector of the measured observable. When measurements are more generally understood as ubiquitous interactions that lead to the formation of quantum correlations, the selection of a preferred basis becomes in most cases a fundamental requirement. This corresponds in general also to the question of what properties are being ascribed to systems (or worlds, minds, etc.). Even where an interpretation implements only a weak notion of the e-e link, and therefore property ascription does not explicitely need to be represented by the choice of an actual preferred basis, the underlying problem is the same: what properties, if any, are to be selected as "determinate", or "possessed" by the system; how are they selected; and, last but not least, the question whether these properties then coincide with the determinate properties of our experience. Thus the preferred basis problem is at the heart of any interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Some of the difficulties related to the preferred basis problem that interpretations face are then (i) to decide whether the selection of any preferred basis (or quantity or property) is justified at all or only an artefact of our subjective experience; (ii) if we decide on (i) in the positive, to select the determinate quantity or quantities (what appears determinate to us does not need to be appear determinate to other kinds of observers, nor does it need to be the "true" determinate property); (iii) to avoid any ad hoc character of the choice and any possible empirical inadequacy or inconsistency with the confirmed predictions of standard quantum mechanics; (iv) if a multitude of quantities is selected that apply differently among different systems, to be able to formulate specific rules that determine the determinate quantity or quantities under every circumstance; (v) to ensure that the basis is chosen such that if the system is embedded into a larger (composite) system, the principle of property composition holds, i.e., the property selected by the basis of the original system should persist also when the system is considered as part of a larger composite system. 13 The hope is then that environment-induced superselection of a preferred basis can provide a universal mechanism that fulfills the above criteria and solves the preferred basis problem on strictly physical grounds.
b. Local suppression of interference terms. We have emphasized in various places in this paper that the decohered (i.e., approximately diagonalized through decoherence) local density matrix represents only an improper mixture and we thus must not attach an ensemble interpretation to it, as long as we uphold the standard formalism with its e-e link. Thus to solve the measurement problem, the addition of an interpretive rule is needed that accounts for the perception of outcomes, i.e., of single "pointer readings", and various interpretations have attempted to do so in particular on the basis of the decohered density matrix, also because this leads, almost automatically, to consistency with the predictions of Schrödinger dynamics and thus presumably to empirical adequacy. Therefore the suppression of local interference can be, and has been, used to physically motivate (or to falsify) certain assumptions and elements of interpretations.
B. Type-1 interpretations
This is the class of interpretations that modify the measurement formalism itself as represented by the von Neumann scheme of Eq. (2.1). The von Neumann approach is characterized by the assumption that the initial state before the measurement is represented by the tensor product formed between the pure initial state of the system and the "ready" state of the apparatus. The assumption of a unitary time evolution then forces this product state to transform into a pure product state, i.e., a superposition of pointer states which entails the well-known problem of how to reconcile this superposition with the observation of outcomes.
A modification to this scheme that proposes a different representation of the state of affairs before the measurement (instead of, as in most other interpretations, attempting to somehow evolve the pure-state superposition obtained after the measurement interaction into an ignorance-interpretable ensemble) has been suggested by Fine (1987 Fine ( , 1993 .
The approach is characterized by the insight that measurements are selective interactions in the sense that any observation always looks only at a particular "aspect" of the system, represented by an observable A of the system S; it is measured by an apparatus that is designed to interact with this " A-aspect" of S but that will typically be blind to the features that are not "relevant" to A. Everything a measurement can do and is expected to do is to reveal the probability distribution P( A, ψ) of the possible values of the measured observable A of the system in the state ψ. Accordingly, Fine takes P( A, ψ) as the relevant aspect. Therefore it is proposed that for the purpose of measurement, everything that is of interest about the system S is contained in the mixture ρ S = n |c n | 2 |a n a n |, where the |c n | 2 are the usual Born probabilities, and the |a n a n | are the projection operators onto the eigenvectors |a n of A.
Thus this approach takes the diagonal density matrix ρ S of the system as the proper starting point for the measurement interaction, rather than considering the full pure state superposition represented by ρ * S = m c m c * n |a m a n | as in the von Neumann formalism.
The empirical adequacy of this assumption finds its physically motivated support in the decoherence program that describes the environment-induced dynamical diagonalization of local density matrices that suppresses locally and FAPP the interference terms in these density matrices. Since Fine's approach entails the replacement of the pure state density matrix by an ensemble, a process that is outside of the standard quantum mechanical formalism on which decoherence is based, Fine's assumption is too strong to be derived from such decoherence effects, but decoherence plays the important rôle of ensuring the empirical adequacy of the viewpoint taken by Fine, i.e., that neglecting the interference terms by using a mixture instead of the pure-state superposition in the description of the initial state of the system will be consistent with our observation in practical measurement situations (that involve typically macroscopic measuring devices that will be subject to strong decoherence).
C. Type-2 interpretations
These are interpretations that modify the assumption of an universal validity of the unitary time evolution in order to solve the measurement problem. We shall discuss the implications of decoherence for three members of this class: The standard (or orthodox) interpretation (the basic quantum mechanical formalism with the collapse postulate), the Copenhagen interpretation (that employs a fundamentally classical apparatus as bringing about the collapse), and physical collapse theories (realized through stochastic state vector reduction or spontaneous localization).
The standard interpretation
As it is well known, the standard interpretation ("orthodox" quantum mechanics) postulates that every measurement induces a discontinuous break in the unitary time evolution of the state through the collapse of the total wave function onto one of its terms in the state vector expansion (uniquely determined by the eigenbasis of the measured observable), which selects a single term in the superposition as representing the outcome. The nature of the collapse is not at all explained, and thus the definition of measurement remains unclear. Macroscopic superpositions are not a priori forbidden, but never observed since any observation would entail a measurement-like interaction.
Since property ascription is determined by the observable that represents the measurement (since the observable defines the preferred basis), but any (Hermitian) operator can play the rôle of an observable, any given state has the potentiality to an infinite number of different properties whose attribution is usually mutually exclusive unless the corresponding observables commute (since in this case they share a common eigenbasis which pre-serves the uniqueness of the preferred basis). What determines then the observable that is being measured? As our discussion in Sec. II.C has demonstrated, the derivation of the measured observable from the particular form of a given state vector expansion can lead to paradoxial results since this expansion is in general nonunique, so the observable must be chosen by other means. In the orthodox interpretation, it is then essentially the "user" that simply "chooses" the particular observable to be measured and thus determines which properties the system possesses.
This positivist point of view has of course led to a lot of controversy, since it runs counter to an attempted account of an observer-independent reality (that has been the central pursuit of natural science since its beginning). Moreover, in practice, one certainly does not have the freedom to choose any arbitrary observable and measure it; instead, we have "instruments" (including our senses, etc.) that are designed to measure a particular observable-for most (maybe all) practical purposes, this will ultimately boil down to a single relevant observable, namely, position. But what, then, makes the instruments designed for such a particular observable?
Answering these crucial questions means essentially to abandon the orthodox view of treating measurement as a "black box" process that has little, if any, relation to the workings of actual physical measurements (to be understood in the broadest sense of "monitoring" of the state of the system). The first key point, the understanding of measurements as a general formation of quantum correlations between system and apparatus, goes back to the early years of quantum mechanics and is reflected in the measurement scheme of von Neumann (1932), but it does not resolve the issue how and which observables are chosen. The second key point, the explicit inclusion of the natural environment into the measurement process, was brought into quantum theory only by the studies of decoherence. Zurek's (1981) stability criterion discussed in Section III.D has shown that measurements must be of such nature as to establish stable records, where stability is to be understood as preserving the system-apparatus correlations in spite of the inevitable interaction of the apparatus with the environment. The "user" cannot choose the observables arbitrarily, but he must design a measuring device whose interaction with the environment is such as to ensure stable records in the sense above (which in turn defines a measuring device for this observable). In the reading of the orthodox interpretation, this can be interpreted as the environment determining the properties of the system.
In this sense, the decoherence program has embedded the rather formal concept of measurement as proposed by the orthodox interpretation-with its vague notion of observables that are seemingly freely chosen by the observer-into a more realistic and physical framework, namely, via the specification of observer-free criteria for the selection of the measured observable through the physical structure of the measuring device and its in-teraction with environment that is in most cases needed to amplify the measurement record and to thereby make it accessible to the external observer.
The Copenhagen interpretation
The Copenhagen interpretation differs from the Standard interpretation in its key postulate of the fundamental necessity of classical concepts in order to describe quantum phenomena. Classicality is not derived from quantum mechanics, for example, as the macroscopic limit of an underlying quantum structure (as it is in some sense assumed, however not explicitely derived, in the standard interpretation), but instead it is viewed as an indispensable and irreducible element of a complete quantum theory (and, in fact, it is considered as a concept prior to quantum theory). In particular, the Copenhagen interpretation postulates the existence of macroscopic measurement apparatuses that obey classical physics and that are not supposed to be described in quantum mechanical terms (in sharp contrast to the von Neumann measurement scheme that rather belongs to the standard interpretation); such a classical apparatus is considered necessary in order to make quantum mechanical phenomena accessible to us in terms of the "classical" world of our experience. This strict dualism between the system S (to be described by quantum mechanics) and the apparatus A (obeying classical physics) also entails the existence of an essentially fixed boundary between S and A which separates the microworld from the macroworld ("Heisenberg cut"). This boundary cannot be moved significantly without destroying the observed phenomenon (i.e., the full interacting compound SA).
Especially in the light of the insights gained from decoherence it seems impossible to uphold the notion of a fixed quantum-classical boundary on a fundamental level of the theory. Environment-induced superselection and suppression of interference have demonstrated how quasiclassical robust states can emerge, or remain absent, using the quantum formalism alone and over a broad range of microscopic to macroscopic scales, and have established the notion that the boundary between S and A is to a large extent movable towards A. Similar results have been obtained from the general study of quantum nondemolition measurements (Auletta, 2000, Ch. 19) , of which a specific instance are the "measurements" performed by the environment on a system. Also note that since the apparatus is described in classical terms, it is macroscopic by definition; but not every apparatus must be macrosopic: the actual "instrument" can well be microscopic, only the "amplifier" must be macrosopic. As an example, consider Zurek's (1981) toy model of decoherence, outlined in Sec. III.E.2, where the instrument can be represented by a bistable atom (with two spin states), and the environment plays the rôle of the amplifier; a more realistic example is the macrosopic detector for gravitational waves that is treated as a QM harmonic oscillator.
Based on the current progress already achieved by the decoherence program, it is reasonable to anticipate that decoherence embedded into some additional interpretive structure may actually lead to a complete and consistent derivation of the classical world from quantum mechanical principles. This would make the assumption of an intrinsically classical apparatus (which has to be treated outside of the realm of quantum mechanics), implying a fundamental and fixed boundary between the quantum mechanical system and the classical apparatus, appear neither as a necessary nor as a viable postulate. Bacciagaluppi (2003b, p. 22) refers to this strategy as "having Bohr's cake and eating it": to acknowledge the correctness of Bohr's notion of the necessity of a classical world ("having Bohr's cake"), but to be able to view the classical world as part of and as emerging from a purely quantum mechanical world ("eating it").
Physical collapse theories
The basic idea of these theories is to introduce an explicit modification of the Schrödinger time evolution to achieve a physical mechanism for state vector reduction. This is in general motivated by a "realist" interpretation of the state vector, that is, the state vector is directly identified with a physical state, which then requires the reduction to one of the terms in the superposition to establish equivalence to the observed determinate properties of physical states (at least as far as the macroscopic realm is concerned). The two main alternatives proposed are outlined in the following (for an extensive review see Pearle, 1999 ). a. Stochastic dynamical reduction ("SDR"). Terms with randomly fluctuating coefficients (random external white noise, such as in Brownian motion) are added to the Schrödinger equation which make the squared amplitudes |c n (t)| 2 in the state vector expansion |Ψ(t) = n c n (t)|ψ n also fluctuate randomly in time, while maintaining the normalization condition n |c n (t)| 2 = 1 for all t (Gisin, 1984; Pearle, 1979) . The terms are chosen such that "eventually" one |c n (t)| 2 → 1 while all other squared coefficients → 0 (the "gambler's ruin game" mechanism), where |c n (t)| 2 → 1 with probability |c n (t = 0)| 2 (the squared coefficients in the initial precollapse state vector expansion) for consistency with the Born probability interpretation of the expansion coefficients.
b. Spontaneous localization ("GRW"). State vector reduction is not implemented as a dynamical process (i.e., as a continuous evolution over time), but instead occurs instantaneously (and spontaneously) and leads to a spatial localization of the wave function (Ghirardi et al., 1986) . To be precise, the N -particle wave function ψ(x 1 , . . . , x N ) is at random intervals multiplied by a Gaussian of the form exp(−(X − x k ) 2 /2∆ 2 ) (this process is often called a "hit" or a "jump"), and the resulting product is subsequently normalized. The occurrence of these hits is not explained, but rather postulated as a new fundamental physical mechanism. Both the coordinate x k and the "center of the hit" X are chosen at random, but the probability for a specific X is postulated to be given by the squared inner product of ψ(x 1 , . . . , x N ) with the Gaussian (and therefore hits are more likely to occur where |ψ| 2 , viewed as a function of x k only, is large).
The time constant λ for a hit to occur for a single particle is chosen such as to effectively preserve unitary time evolution for microscopic systems (with only few particles), while ensuring that for macroscopic objects (containing a very large number N of particles) the localization occurs rapidly (on the order of N λ −1 ) such as to preclude the persistence of spatially separated macroscopic superpositons (such as the pointer being in a superpositon of "up" and "down") on time scales sufficient for any observation to detect them (GRW choose λ −1 ≈ 10 16 sec ≈ 3 × 10 8 years). Inevitable coupling to the environment can in general be expected to lead to a further drastic increase of N and therefore to an even higher localization rate (even though the localization process itself is independent of any interaction with environment, in sharp contrast to the decoherence approach).
c. The preferred basis problem. The central objection raised against SDR (for instance by Pearle, 1989 ) is the preferred basis problem: what determines the terms in the state vector expansion into which the state vector gets reduced? Why does reduction lead to precisely the distinct macroscopic states of our experience and not superpositions thereof? Physical collapse models simply provide an explicit physical mechanism by which state reduction is brought about; whether it is relevant to the preferred basis problem can be made dependent on the particular interpretation. In the orthodox interpretation, for example, the question is answered by referring to the choice of the observable being measured. If, on the other hand, wave function collapse is removed from the restrictive context of measurements (in the sense of "experiments" performed by an external observer who can arbitrarily select the measured quantity) and is rather understood as a universal mechanism that acts constantly on every state vector regardless of an explicit measurement situation, the preferred basis problem entails indeed a difficulty that the SDR model has to deal with but does not seem to be able to solve by itself.
Once again, taking into account environment-induced superselection of a preferred basis could help resolve this issue. Decoherence has been shown to occur, especially for mesoscopic and macroscopic objects, on extremely short time scales, and thus is presumably able to bring about basis selection much faster than the time required for dynamical fluctuations to establish a "winning" expansion coefficient.
In contrast, the GRW theory solves the preferred basis problem by avoiding the reduction to a particular state in the state vector expansion (with its nonunique basis), and instead postulating position as the universal preferred basis; state vector reduction then amounts to simply modifying the (functional) shape of the projection of the state vector |ψ onto the position basis x 1 , . . . , x N |. This is motivated by the insight that essentially all (human) observations must be grounded in a position measurement. 14 On one hand, the choice of position as the preferred basis is supported by the decoherence program that demonstrates that the fact that physical interactions frequently depend on distance-dependent laws leads, given the stability criterion, indeed to position as the preferred observable. In this sense, decoherence provides a physical motivation for the assumption of the GRW theory. On the other hand, however, it makes GRW's assumption appear as too restrictive as it cannot account for cases where position is not the preferred basis-for instance, in microscopic systems where typically energy is the robust observable, or in the superposition of (macroscopic) currents in SQUIDs. GRW simply exclude such cases by choosing the parameters of the spontaneous localization process such that microscopic systems remain generally unaffected by any state vector reduction. The basis selection approach proposed by the decoherence program is therefore much more general and also avoids the ad hoc character of the GRW model by allowing for a range of preferred observables and motivating their choice on physical grounds. d. Simultaneous presence of decoherence and spontaneous localization. Since decoherence can be considered as an omnipresent mechanism that has been extensively verified both theoretically and experimentally, the assumption that the GRW model holds entails that the evolution of a system must be guided by both decoherence effects and spontaneous localization.
Let us first consider the situation where decoherence effects are such as to lead to the selection of position as the preferred basis (as in many situations where the system-environment interaction is dominantly guided by distance-dependent terms in the Hamiltonian). In this case, decoherence effects and GRW's localization hits will act constructively in the same direction, and the question arises in which order these two mechanisms influence the evolution of the system (Bacciagaluppi, 2003a) . If spontaneous localization occurs on a shorter time scale than environment-induced superselection of a preferred basis and suppression of local interference, decoherence will in most cases have very little influence on the evolution of the system since typically the system will already have evolved into a state of definite position. Conversely, if decoherence effects act more quickly on the system than the localization hits, the interaction with the environment will presumably lead to the preparation of quasi-classical robust states that are subsequently chosen by the localization mechanism. As pointed out in Sec. III.E.2, decoherence occurs usually on extremely short time scales which can be shown to be significantly smaller than the action of the GRW localization process for most cases (Benatti et al., 1995; Tegmark, 1993) . This indicates that decoherence effects will play an important rôle also in the GRW model, i.e., even in the presence of a localization mechanism.
The second case occurs when decoherence leads to the selection of a different preferred basis than position. As remarked by Bacciagaluppi (2003a,b) , one might then imagine either the GRW collapse to occur only at the level of the environment (which would then serve as an amplifying and recording device with different localization properties than the system under study which would remain in the quasi-classical states selected by decoherence), or to an explicit "competition" between decoherence effects and GRW localization. e. FAPP and the tails problem. The clear advantage of physical collapse models over the consideration of decoherence-induced effects alone for a solution to the measurement problem lies in the fact that an actual state reduction is achieved such that one may be tempted to conclude that at the conclusion of the reduction process the system actually is in a determinate state. Both the SDR and GRW model however achieve only an approximate (FAPP) reduction of the wave function. In the case of SDR, |c n (t)| 2 ∈ {0, 1} only in the limit t → ∞, so for finite times the state will always retain small interference terms. Similarly, in the GRW theory the width ∆ of the multiplying Gaussian cannot be made arbitrarily small, and therefore the reduced wave packet cannot be made infinitely sharply localized in position space, since this would entail an infinitely large energy gain by the system via the time-energy uncertainty relation, which would certainly show up experimentally (GRW choose ∆ ≈ 10 −5 cm). This leads to wave function "tails" (Albert and Loewer, 1996) , that is, in any region in space and at any time t > 0, the wave function will remain nonzero if it has been nonzero at t = 0 (before the collapse), and thus there will be always a part of the system that is not "here".
This entails that physical collapse models that achieve reduction only FAPP require a modification, namely, a weakening, of the e-e link to allow one to speak of the system actually being in a definite state, and thereby to ensure the objective attribution of determinate properties to the system. It should be noted, however, that such "fuzzy" e-e links may in turn lead to difficulties, as the discussion of Lewis' "counting anomaly" has shown (Lewis, 1997) .
In this sense, collapse models are as much "just fine FAPP" as decoherence is, where perfect orthogonality of the environment states is only attained as t → ∞. The severity of the consequences, however, is not equivalent for the two strategies. Since collapse models directly change the state vector, a single "outcome" is at least approximately selected, and it only requires a "slight" weakening of the e-e link (whose strict formulation as spelled out in the orthodox interpretation is neither forced upon us by the quantum mechanical formalism nor by empirical constraints; see Bub, 1997) to make this state of affairs correspond to the (objective) existence of a determinate physical property. In the case of decoherence, however, the lack of a precise destruction of interference terms is not the main problem that is at stake; even if exact orthogonality of the environment states were ensured at all times, the resulting reduced density matrix would still represent an improper mixture, with no outcome having been singled out according to the e-e link, regardless of whether the e-e link is expressed in the strong or weakened (GRW) form.
f. Similarities between decoherence and GRW. It has been realized early that there exist a striking formal similarity of the equations that govern the time evolution of density matrices in the GRW theory and models of decoherence. For example, the GRW equation for a single free mass point reads (Ghirardi et al., 1986, Eq. 3.5 
where the second term on the rhs accounts for the destruction of spatially separated interference terms. A simple model for environment-induced decoherence yields a very similar equation (Joos and Zeh, 1985, Eq. 3.75 ), see also the comment by Joos (1987) . Thus the physical justification for an ad hoc postulate of an explicit reduction-inducing mechanism could be questioned (modulo the interpretive difference between approximately proper ensembles as arising from GRW and the improper ensembles resulting from decoherence). More constructively, the similarity of the governing equations might enable one to motivate the choice of the free parameters of collapse models on physical grounds rather than on the basis of simply ensuring empirical adequacy-or of precluding any experimental falsification-of collapse models.
At the same time, the similarity of the governing equations and resulting density matrices in the GRW theory and arising from decoherence can, to some extent, be viewed as "protecting" collapse models from empirical falsification. This is so because the inevitable and ubiquitous interaction with the environment will always, FAPP of observation (that is, statistical prediction), result in (local) density matrices that are formally very similar to those of collapse models. What is measured is not the state vector itself, but the probability distribution of outcomes, i.e., values of a physical quantity, and this information is equivalently contained in the state vector and the density matrix. Thus at least once the occurrence of any outcomes at all is ensured through some addition to the interpretive body (a serious, but different problem), measurements with their intrinsically local character cannot distinguish between the probability distribution given by the decohered density matrix and the probability distribution defined by a (approximately) proper mixture obtained from a physical collapse theory. In other words, as long as the free parameters of the collapse model are chosen in agreement with the physically determined parameters of decoherence models, empirical adequacy of collapse models will presumably be ensured since decoherence is an effect that will be present with near certainty in every realistic (especially macroscopic) physical system.
One might of course speculate that the simultaneous presence of both decoherence and localization effects may actually allow for an experimental disproof of the GRW theory by preparing states that differ in an observable manner from the predictions of GRW alone (for proposed experiments to detect the GRW collapse, see for example Rae, 1990; Squires, 1991) . If we acknowledge the existence of interpretations of quantum mechanics which employ only decoherence-induced suppression of interference to consistently explain the perception of apparent collapses (as it is, for example, claimed by the "existential interpretation" of Zurek, 1993 Zurek, , 1998 ), we will not be able to distinguish experimentally between a "true" GRW collapse and a mere suppression of interference as explained by decoherence. Instead, an experimental situation is required in which the GRW model predicts the occurrence of a collapse, but where no suppression of interference through decoherence arises. Again, the problem in the realization of such an experiment lies in the fact that it is very difficult (albeit not impossible) to sufficiently shield a system from decoherence effects; based on explicit calculations, Tegmark (1993) has shown that decoherence due to scattering of environmental particles (such as air molecules or photons) will have a much stronger influence than the proposed GRW effect of spontaneous localization (see also Benatti et al., 1995;  for different results for energy-driven reduction models, cf. Adler, 2001) .
g. Summary and outlook. Decoherence has the definite advantage of being derived directly from the laws of standard quantum mechanics, whereas current collapse models are required to postulate their reduction mechanism as a new fundamental law of nature. Since, on the other hand, collapse models yield, at least FAPP, proper mix-tures, they are capable of providing an "objective" solution to the measurement problem. The formal similarity between the time evolution equations of collapse and decoherence models nourishes hopes that the postulated reduction mechanisms of collapse models could possibly be derived from the ubiquituous and inevitable interaction of every physical system with the environment and the resulting decoherence effects. We may therefore regard collapse models and decoherence not as mutually exclusive alternatives for a solution to the measurement problem, but rather as potential candidates for a fruitful unification. For a vague proposal into this direction, see Pessoa Jr. (1998); Pearle (1999) described speculations that (quantum) gravity might act as a collapse-inducing universal "environment".
D. Type-3 interpretations
This is the class of interpretations that modify the e-e link to allow for the ascription of determinate physical properties to a system even if the system is not in an eigenstate of the observable representing the property. In the following, we shall discuss Everett-style relativestate interpretations, the consistent histories approach, modal interpretations, and Bohmian mechanics.
Everett-style interpretations
Everett's original (1957) proposal of a relative-state interpretation of quantum mechanics has motivated several strands of interpretations, presumably owing to the fact that Everett himself never clearly spelled out how his theory was supposed to work.
The system-observer duality of quantum mechanics that introduces external "observers" into the theory that are not described by the deterministic laws of quantum systems but instead follow a stochastic indeterminism obviously runs into problems when the universe as a whole is considered: by definition, there cannot be any external observers. The central idea of Everett's proposal is then to abandon this duality and instead (1) to assume the existence of a total state |Ψ representing the state of the entire universe and (2) to uphold the universal validity of the Schrödinger evolution, while (3) postulating that all terms in the superposition of the total state at the completion of the measurement actually correspond to physical states. Each such physical state can be understood as relative to the state of the other part in the composite system (as in Everett's original proposal; also see Mermin, 1998a; Rovelli, 1996) , to a particular "branch" of a constantly "splitting" universe (many-worlds interpretations, popularized by Deutsch, 1985; DeWitt, 1970) , or to a particular "mind" in the set of minds of the conscious observer (many-minds interpretation; see, for example, Lockwood, 1996) . In other words, every term in the final-state superposition can be viewed as repre-senting equally "real" physical states that are realized in different "branches of reality".
Decoherence adherents have typically been inclined towards relative-state interpretations (Zeh, 1970 (Zeh, , 1973 (Zeh, , 1993 Zurek, 1998) , presumably because the Everett approach takes unitary quantum mechanics essentially "as is", with a minimum of added interpretive elements, which matches well the spirit of the decoherence program that attempts to explain the emergence of classicality purely from the formalism of basic quantum mechanics. It may also seem natural to identify the decohering components of the wave function with different Everett branches. Conversely, proponents of relative-state interpretations have frequently employed the mechanism of decoherence in solving the difficulties associated with this class of interpretations (see, for example, Deutsch, 1985 Deutsch, , 1996 Deutsch, , 2001 Saunders, 1995 Saunders, , 1997 Saunders, , 1998 Vaidman, 1998; Wallace, 2002 Wallace, , 2003a .
There are many different readings and versions of Everett-type interpretations, especially with respect to what defines the "branches", "worlds", and "minds"; whether we deal with a single, a multitude, or an infinity of such worlds and minds; and whether there is an actual (physical) or only perspectival splitting of the worlds and minds into the different branches corresponding to the terms in the superposition: does the world or mind split into two separate copies (thus somehow doubling all the matter contained in the orginal system), or is there just a "reassignment" of states to a multitude of worlds or minds of constant (typically infinite) number, or is there only one physically existing world or mind where each branch corresponds to different "aspects" (whatever they are) of this world or mind? Regardless, for the following discussion of the key implications of decoherence for such interpretations, the precise details and differences of these various strands of interpretations will, for the most part, be largely irrelevant.
Everett-style interpretations face two core difficulties:
1. The preferred basis problem. If states are only relative, the question arises: relative to what? What determines the particular basis terms that are used to define the branches-which in turn define the worlds or minds in the next instant of time? When precisely does the "splitting" occur? Which properties are made determinate in each branch, and how are they connected to the determinate properties of our experience?
2. The meaning of probabilities (since every outcome actually occurs in some world or mind) and the connection with Born's rule.
a. Everett branches and the preferred basis problem. Stapp (2002 Stapp ( , p. 1043 demanded that "a many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory exists only to the extent that the associated basis problem is solved". In the context of relative-state interpretations the preferred basis problem is not only much more severe than in the orthodox interpretation (if there is any problem at all), but also more fundamental than in many other interpretations for several reasons: (1) The branching occurs continuously and essentially everywhere; in the general sense of measurements understood as the formation of quantum correlations, every newly formed such correlation, whether it pertains to microscopic or macroscopic systems, corresponds to a branching.
(2) The ontological implications are much more drastic, at least in those Everett-type interpretations that assume an actual "splitting" of worlds or minds, since the choice of the basis determines the resulting "world" or "mind" as a whole. The environment-based basis superselection criteria of the decoherence program have frequently been employed to solve the preferred basis problem of Everett-style interpretations (see, for example, Butterfield, 2001; Wallace, 2002 Wallace, , 2003a Zurek, 1998) . There are several advantages in appealing to a decoherence-related approach in selecting the preferred Everett bases: First, no a priori existence of a preferred basis needs to be postulated, but instead the preferred basis arises naturally from the physical criterion of robustness. Second, the selection will be likely to yield empirical adequacy since the decoherence program is solely derived from the well-confirmed Schrödinger dynamics (modulo the possibility that robustness may not the universally valid criterion). Lastly, the decohered components of the wave function evolve such that they can be reidentified over time (forming "trajectories" in the preferred state spaces), thus motivating the use of these components to define stable, temporally extended Everett branches-or, similarly, to ensure robust observer record states and/or environmental states that make information about the state of the system of interest widely accessible to observers (see, for example, Zurek's "existential interpretation" outlined below).
While the idea of directly associating the environmentselected basis states with Everett worlds seems natural and straightforward, it has also been subject to criticism. Stapp (2002) has argued that an Everett-type interpretation must aim at determining a denumerable set of distinct branches that correspond to the apparently discrete events of our experience and to which determinate values and finite probabilities according to the usual rules can be assigned, and that therefore one would need to specify a denumerable set of mutually orthogonal projection operators. Since it is however well-known (Zurek, 1998 ) that frequently the preferred states chosen through the interaction with the environment via the stability criterion form a overcomplete set of states-often a continuum of narrow Gaussian-type wavepackets (for example, the coherent states of harmonic oscillator models Kübler and Zeh, 1973; Zurek et al., 1993 )-that are not necessarily orthogonal (i.e., the Gaussians may overlap), Stapp considers this approach to the preferred basis problem in Everett-type interpretations as not satisfactory. In response to this criticism, Zurek has argued (in private communication with the present author) that the emergence of Gaussians does not need to imply nondiscrete, i.e., "fuzzy", perceptions, since the nonlinearity (namely, approximate bistability) of neurons in the human information-processing machinery seems to be able to ensure "subjective" denumerability and mutual exclusiveness to a sufficiently good approximation to account for our experience of these properties. 15 The approach of using environment-induced superselection and decoherence to define the Everett branches has also been critized on grounds of being "conceptually approximate" since the stability criterion generally leads only to an approximate specification of a preferred basis and can therefore not give an "exact" definition of the Everett branches (see, for example, the comments by Kent, 1990; Zeh, 1973 , and also the well-known anti-FAPP position of Bell, 1982) . Wallace (2003a, pp. 90-91) has argued against such an objection as (. . . ) arising from a view implicit in much discussion of Everett-style interpretations: that certain concepts and objects in quantum mechanics must either enter the theory formally in its axiomatic structure, or be regarded as illusion. (. . . ) [Instead] the emergence of a classical world from quantum mechanics is to be understood in terms of the emergence from the theory of certain sorts of structures and patterns, and that this means that we have no need (as well as no hope!) of the precision which Kent [in his (1990) critique] and others (. . . ) demand.
Accordingly, in view of our argument in Sec. II.B.3 that considers subjective solutions to the measurement problem as sufficient, there is no a priori reason to doubt that also an "approximate" criterion for the selection of the preferred basis can give a meaningful definition of the Everett branches that is empirically adequate and accounts for our experiences. The environment-superselected basis emerges naturally from the physically very reasonable criterion of robustness together with the purely quantum mechanical effect of decoherence. It would in fact be rather difficult to fathom the existence of an axiomatically introduced "exact" rule which would select preferred bases in a manner that can be similarly physically motivated and that ensures empirical adequacy.
Besides using the environment-superselected pointer states to describe the Everett branches, various authors have directly used the instantaneous Schmidt decomposition of the composite state (or, equivalently, the set of orthogonal eigenstates of the reduced density matrix) to define the preferred basis (for a general discussion of the Schmidt basis, see Sec. III.F). This approach is easier to implement than the search for dynamically stable pointer states since the preferred basis follows directly from a simple mathematical diagonalization procedure at each instant of time. Furthermore, it has been favored by some (e.g., Zeh, 1973) since it gives an "exact" rule for basis selection in relative-state interpretations; the consistently quantum origin of the Schmidt decomposition that matches well the "pure quantum mechanics" spirit of Everett's proposal (where the formalism of quantum mechanics supplies its own interpretation) has also been counted as an advantage (Barvinsky and Kamenshchik, 1995) . In an earlier work, Deutsch (1985) attributed a fundamental rôle to the Schmidt decomposition in relative-state interpretations as defining an "interpretation basis" that imposes the precise structure that is needed to give meaning to Everett's basic concept.
However, as pointed out in Sec. III.F, the emerging basis states (instantaneous Schmidt states) will frequently have properties that are very different from those selected by the stability criterion and that are undesirably nonclassical (they may for instance lack the spatial localization of the robustness-selected Gaussians; see Stapp, 2002) . The question to what extent the Schmidt basis states correspond to classical properties in Everett-style relative-state interpretations was investigated in detail by Barvinsky and Kamenshchik (1995) . The authors study the similarity of the states selected by the Schmidt decomposition to coherent states (i.e., minimum-uncertainty Gaussians; see also Eisert, 2003) that are chosen as the "yardstick states" representing classicality. For the investigated toy models it is found that only subsets of the Everett worlds corresponding to the Schmidt decomposition exhibit classicality in this sense; furthermore, the degree of robustness of classicality in these branches is very sensitive to the choice of the initial state and the interaction Hamiltonian, such that classicality emerges typically only temporarily, and the Schmidt basis generally lacks robustness under time evolution. Similar difficulties with the Schmidt basis approach have been described by Kent and McElwaine (1997) .
These findings indicate that the basis selection criterion based on robustness provides a much more meaningful, physically transparent and general rule for the selection of quasiclassical branches in relative-state interpretations, especially with respect to its ability to lead to wave function components representing quasiclassical properties that can be reidentified over time (which a simple diagonalization of the reduced density matrix at each instant of time does general not allow for).
b. Probabilities
in Everett interpretations. Various decoherence-unrelated attempts have been made towards a consistent derivation of the Born probabilities (for example, Deutsch, 1999; DeWitt, 1971; Everett, 1957; Geroch, 1984; Graham, 1973; Hartle, 1968 ) in the (explicit or implicit) context of a relative-state interpretation, but several arguments have been pre-sented that indicate that these approaches fail (see, for example, the critiques by Barnum et al., 2000; Kent, 1990; Squires, 1990; Stein, 1984 ; but note the arguments of Wallace, 2003b and Gill, 2003 defending the approach of Deutsch, 1999; see also Saunders, 2002) . When the effects of decoherence and environment-induced superselection are included, it seems natural to identify the diagonal elements of the decohered reduced density matrix (in the environment-superselected basis) with the set of possible elementary events and interpreting the corresponding coefficients as relative frequencies of worlds (or minds, etc.) in the Everett theory (assuming a, typically infinite, multitude of worlds, minds, etc.). Since decoherence enables one to reidentify the individual localized components of the wave function over time (describing, for example, observers and their measurement outcomes attached to individual well-defined "worlds"), this leads to a natural interpretation of the Born probabilities as empirical frequencies. However, decoherence cannot yield an actual derivation of the Born rule (for an attempt in this direction, see Zurek, 1998) . As mentioned before, this is so because the key elements of the decoherence program, the formalism and the interpretation of reduced density matrices and the trace rule, presume the Born rule. Attempts to consistently derive probabilities from density matrices and the trace rule are therefore subject to the charge of circularity (Zeh, 1996) . In Sec. III.G, we have discussed a proposal by Zurek (2003b) that tries to evade this circularity and suggests a derivation of the Born rule directly from more fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, but we have argued that also this derivation requires a set of assumptions to go through. Nonwithstanding these comments, decoherence combined with this approach provides a framework in which quantum probabilities and the Born rule can be given a rather natural motivation, definition and interpretation in the context of relative-state interpretations. c. The "existential interpretation". A well-known Everett-type interpretation that rests heavily on decoherence has been proposed by Zurek (1993 Zurek ( , 1998 . This approach, termed "existential interpretation", defines the reality (or objective existence) of a state as the possibility of finding out what the state is and simultaneously leaving it unperturbed (similar to a classical state). 16 Zurek assigns a "relative objective existence" to the robust states selected by the environmental stability criterion; these states represent the elementary "events" whose probability are assumed to be inferred from the corresponding coefficient in the density matrix (this must presume an independent derivation of the connection between the state vector and the Born probabilities; see previous paragraph).
By measuring properties of the system-environment interaction Hamiltonian and employing the commutativity criterion (or similar other criteria), the observer can, at least in principle, determine the set of observables that can be measured on the system without perturbing it and thus find out its "objective" state. Alternatively, the observer can take advantage of the redundant records of the state of the system as monitored by the environment. By intercepting parts of this environment, for example, a fraction of the surrounding photons, he can determine the state of the system essentially without perturbing it (cf. also the related recent ideas of "quantum darwinism" and the rôle of the environment as a "witness", see Ollivier et al., 2003; Zurek, 2003c) . 17 Zurek emphasizes the importance of stable records of observers, i.e., robust correlations between the environment-selected states and the memory states of the observer. Information must be represented physically, and thus the "objective" state of the observer who has detected one of the potential outcomes of a measurement must be physically distinct and objectively different (since the record states can be determined from the outside without perturbing them-see the previous paragraph) from the state of an observer who has recorded an alternative outcome. The different "objective" states of the observer are, via quantum correlations, attached to different branches defined by the environment-selected robust states; they thus ultimately "label" the different branches of the universal state vector. This is claimed to lead to the perception of classicality; the impossibility of perceiving arbitrary superpositions is explained via the quick suppression of interference between different memory states induced by decoherence, where each (physically distinct) memory state represents an individual observer identity.
A similar argument has been given by Zeh (1993) who employs decoherence together with an (implicit) branching process to explain the perception of definite outcomes:
[A]fter an observation one need not necessarily conclude that only one component now exists but only that only one component is observed.
(. . . ) Superposed world components describing the registration of different macroscopic properties by the "same" observer are dynamically entirely independent of one another: they describe different observers. (. . . ) He who considers this conclusion of an indeterminism or splitting of the observer's identity, derived from the Schrödinger 17 The partial ignorance is necessary to avoid the redefinition of the state of the system. equation in the form of dynamically decoupling ("branching") wave packets on a fundamental global configuration space, as unacceptable or "extravagant" may instead dynamically formalize the superfluous hypothesis of a disappearance of the "other" components by whatever method he prefers, but he should be aware that he may thereby also create his own problems: Any deviation from the global Schrödinger equation must in principle lead to observable effects, and it should be recalled that none have ever been discovered.
The existential interpretation continues Everett's goal of interpreting quantum mechanics using the quantum mechanical formalism itself. Zurek takes the standard quantum theory (without collapse) "as is" and explores to what extent the incorporation of environment-induced superselection and decoherence, together with a minimal additional interpretive framework, could form a viable interpretation that suggests a solution to the key problem of quantum mechanics, namely, the emergence of (perceived) classicality. The embedding of decoherence into a relative-state framework demonstrates again that an additional foundational approach is required to resolve the measurement problem even if decoherence effects are considered (cf. our discussion in Sec. IV).
Consistent histories interpretations
The consistent (or decoherent) histories approach was introduced by Griffiths (1984 Griffiths ( , 1993 Griffiths ( , 1996 and further developed by Omnès (1988a Omnès ( ,b,c, 1990 Omnès ( , 1992 Omnès ( , 1994 Omnès ( , 2003 , , 1991a , 1991b , Dowker and Halliwell (1992) , and others. Reviews of the program can be found in the papers by Omnès (1992) and Halliwell (1993 Halliwell ( , 1996 ; thoughtful critiques investigating key features and assumptions of the approach have been given, for example, by d' Espagnat (1989) , Kent (1995, 1996) , and Bassi and Ghirardi (1999) . The basic idea of the consistent histories approach is to eliminate the fundamental rôle of measurements in quantum mechanics, and instead study quantum histories, defined as sequences of events represented by sets of time-ordered projection operators, and to assign probabilities to such histories. The approach was originally motivated by quantum cosmology, i.e., the study of the evolution of the entire universe, which, by definition, represents a closed system, and therefore no external observer can be invoked (as, for example, in the Copenhagen interpretation).
a. Definition of histories. We assume that a physical system S is described by a density matrix ρ 0 at some initial time t 0 and define a sequence of arbitrary times t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t n with t 1 > t 0 . For each time point t i in this sequence, we consider an exhaustive set
αi (t i ) | α i = 1, 2, . . . , n i }, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, of mutually orthogonal Hermitian projection operators P (i)
(5.2) and evolving, using the Heisenberg picture, according to
where U (t 0 , t) is the operator that dynamically propagates the state vector from t 0 to t. A possible, "maximally fine-grained" history is defined by the sequence of times t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t n and by the choice of one projection operator in the set P (i) for each time point t i in the sequence, i.e., by the set
We also define the set H = {H {α} } of all possible histories for a given time sequence t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t n . The natural interpretation of a history H {α} is then to take it as a series of propositions of the form "the system S was, at time t i , in a state of the subspace spanned by P (i) αi (t i )". Maximally fine-grained histories can be combined to form "coarse-grained" sets which assign to each time point t i a linear combination 1}, (5.5) of the original projection operators P αi (t i ) chosen at a certain instant t i in time in order to form a history H {α} were independent of the choice of the projection operators at earlier times t 0 < t < t i in H {α} . This situation was generalized by Omnès (1988a Omnès ( ,b,c, 1990 Omnès ( , 1992 to include "branch-dependent" histories of the form (see also Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1993) 
(t 2 ), . . . , P (n,α1,...,αn−1)
b. Probabilities and consistency. In standard quantum mechanics, we can always assign probabilities to single events, represented by the eigenstates of some projection operator P (i) (t), via the rule p(i, t) = Tr( P (i) † (t)ρ(t 0 ) P (i) (t)).
(5.7)
The natural extension of this formula to the calculation of the probability p(H {α} ) of a history H {α} is given by
where the so-called "decoherence functional" D(α, β) is defined by D(α, β) = Tr P (n) αn (t n ) · · · P (1) α1 (t 1 )ρ 0 P
(1) β1 (t 1 ) · · · P (n) βn (t n ) .
(5.9) If we instead work in the Schrödinger picture, the decoherence functional is
Consider now the coarse-grained history that arises from the combination of the two maximally fine-grained histories H {α} and H {β} . Then the probability for this combined history is, from Eq. (5.8),
(5.11) If the last term is nonzero, the usual sum rule for calculating probabilities is obviously violated; this situation arises when quantum interference between the two combined histories H {α} and H {β} is present. Therefore, to ensure that the standard sum rules of probability theory hold also for coarse-grained histories, the following (sufficient and necessary) "consistency condition" must be imposed onto the set H of possible histories (Griffiths, 1984; Omnès, 1990 Omnès, , 1992 :
(5.12)
However, Gell-Mann and have pointed out that when decoherence effects are included to model the emergence of classicality, it is more natural to require D(α, β) = δ α,β D(α, α).
(5.13) Condition (5.12) has often been referred to as "weak decoherence", (5.13) as "medium decoherence" (for a proposal of a criterion for "strong decoherence", see Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1998) . The set H of histories is called consistent (or decoherent) when all its members H {α} fulfill the consistency condition, Eqs. (5.12) or (5.13), i.e., when they can be regarded as independent (noninterfering).
c. Selection of histories and classicality. Even when the stronger consistency criterion (5.13) is imposed on the set H of possible histories, the number of mutually incompatible consistent histories remains relatively large (d 'Espagnat, 1989; Dowker and Kent, 1996) . It is a priori not at all clear that at least some of these histories should represent any meaningful set of propositions about the world of our observation. Even if a collection of such "meaningful" histories is found, it leaves open the question how and which additional criteria would need to be invoked to select such histories. Griffith's (1984) original aim in formulating the consistency criterion was solely to describe a formalism which leads to a consistent description of sequences of events in closed quantum systems without running into logical contradictions. 18 Commonly, however, consistency has also been tied to the emergence of classicality. For example, the consistency criterion corresponds to the demand for the absence of quantum interference-a property of classicality-between two combined histories. However, it has become clear that most consistent histories are in fact flagrantly nonclassical (Albrecht, 1993; Kent, 1995, 1996; Hartle, 1990, 1991b; Paz and Zurek, 1993; Zurek, 1993) . For instance, when the projection operators P (i) αi (t i ) are chosen to be the time-evolved eigenstates of the initial density matrix ρ(t 0 ), the consistency condition will automatically be fulfilled; yet, the histories composed of these projection operators have been shown to result in highly nonclassical macroscopic superpositions when applied to standard examples such as quantum measurement or Schrödinger's cat. This demonstrates that the consistency condition cannot serve as a sufficient criterion for classicality.
d. Consistent histories of open systems. Various authors have therefore appealed to the interaction with the environment and the resulting decoherence effects in defining additional criteria that would select quasiclassical histories and would also lead to a physical motivation for the consistency criterion (see, for example, Albrecht, 1992 Albrecht, , 1993 Anastopoulos, 1996; Dowker and Halliwell, 1992; Finkelstein, 1993; Hartle, 1990, 1998; Halliwell, 2001; Paz and Zurek, 1993; Twamley, 1993b; Zurek, 1993) . This intrinsically requires the notion of local, open systems and the split of the universe into subsystems, in contrast to the original aim of the consistent histories approach to describe the evolution of a single closed, undivided system, typically taken to be the entire universe. The decoherence-based studies then assume the usual decomposition of the total Hilbert space H into a space H S , corresponding to the system S, and H E of the environment E. One studies then the histories of the system S by employing projection operator that only act on the system, i.e., that are of the form P 
αi (t i ) only acts on H S . This poses the question under which circumstances the reduced density matrix ρ S = Tr E ρ SE of the system S suffices to calculate the decoherence functional, since the reduced density matrix arises from a nonunitary trace over E at every time point t i , whereas the decoherence functional of Eq. (5.10) employs the full, unitarily evolving density matrix ρ SE for all times t i < t f and only applies a nonunitary trace operation (over both S and E) at the final time t f . Paz and Zurek (1993) have answered this (rather technical) question by showing that the decoherence functional can be expressed entirely in terms of the reduced density matrix if the time evolution of the reduced density matrix is independent of the correlations dynamically formed between the system and the environment. A necessary (but not always sufficient) condition for this requirement to be satisfied is given by demand that the reduced dynamics must be governed by a master equation that is local in time.
When a "reduced" decoherence functional exists (at least to a good approximation, i.e., when the reduced dynamics are sufficiently insensitive to the formation of system-environment correlations), it implies that the consistency of histories pertaining to the whole universe (with a unitarily evolving density matrix ρ SE and sequences of projection operators of the form P (i) αi (t i ) ⊗ I E ) will be directly related to the consistency of histories of the open system S alone, described by the nonunitarily (due to the trace operation) evolving reduced density matrix ρ S (t i ) and with the events within the histories represented by the "reduced" projection operators P (i) αi (t i ) (Zurek, 1993) . e. Schmidt states vs. pointer basis as projectors. The ability of the instantaneous eigenstates of the reduced density matrix (Schmidt states) to serve as projectors for consistent histories and to possibly lead to the emergence of quasiclassical histories has been studied in much detail (Albrecht, 1992 (Albrecht, , 1993 Kent and McElwaine, 1997; Paz and Zurek, 1993; Zurek, 1993) . Paz and Zurek (1993) have shown that Schmidt projectors P (i) αi , defined by their commutativity with the evolved, path-projected reduced density matrix, that is, (5.14) will always give rise to an infinite number of sets of consistent histories ("Schmidt histories"). However, these histories are branch-dependent, see Eq. (5.6), and usually extremely unstable, since small modifications of the time sequence used for the projections (for instance by deleting a time point) will typically lead to drastic changes in the resulting history, indicating that Schmidt histories are usually very nonclassical Zurek, 1993) . This situation is changed when the time points t i are chosen such that the intervals (t i+1 − t i ) are larger than the typical decoherence time τ D of the system over which the reduced density matrix becomes (approximately) diagonal in the preferred pointer basis chosen through environment-induced superselection (cf. our discussion in Sec. III.F). When the resulting pointer states, rather than the instantaneous Schmidt states, are used to define the projection operators, stable quasiclassical histories will typically emerge Zurek, 1993) . In this sense, it has been suggested that the interaction with the environment can provide the missing selection criterion that ensures the quasiclassicality of histories, i.e., their stability (predictability), and the correspondence of the projection operators (the pointer basis) to the preferred determinate quantities of our experience.
The approximate noninterference (and thus consistency) of histories based on the use of local density operators (energy, number, momentum, charge etc.) as quasiclassical projectors ("hydrodynamic observables", see Dowker and Halliwell, 1992; Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1991b; Halliwell, 1998) has been attributed to the observation that the eigenstates of the local density operators exhibit dynamical stability which leads to decoherence in the corresponding basis (Halliwell, 1998 (Halliwell, , 1999 . It has been argued by Zurek (2003a) that this behavior and thus the special quasiclassical properties of hydrodynamic observables can be explained by the fact that these observables fulfill the commutativity criterion, Eq. (3.9), of the environment-induced superselection approach.
f. Exact vs. approximate consistency. In the idealized case where the pointer states lead to an exact diagonalization of the reduced density matrix, histories composed of the corresponding "pointer projectors" will automatically be consistent. However, under realistic circumstances decoherence will typically only lead to approximate diagonality in the pointer basis. This implies that the consistency criterion will not be fulfilled exactly and that hence the probability sum rules will only hold approximately-although usually, due to the efficiency of decoherence, to a very good approximation (Albrecht, 1992 (Albrecht, , 1993 Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1991b; Griffiths, 1984; Omnès, 1992 Omnès, , 1994 Paz and Zurek, 1993; Twamley, 1993b; Zurek, 1993) . In this sense, the consistency criterion has been viewed as both overly restrictive (since the quasiclassical "pointer projectors" rarely obey the consistency equations exactly) and insufficient (since it does not lead to constraints that can single out quasiclassical histories).
A relaxation of the consistency criterion has therefore been suggested which leads to "approximately consistent histories" whose decoherence functional is allowed to contain nonvanishing off-diagonal terms (corresponding to a violation of the probability sum rules) as long as the net effect of all the off-diagonal terms is "small" in the sense of remaining below the experimentally detectable level (see, for example, Dowker and Halliwell, 1992; Gell-Mann and Hartle, 1991b) . Gell-Mann and Hartle (1991b) have even ascribed a fundamental rôle to such approximately consistent histories, a move that has sparked much controversy and has been considered as unnecessary and irrelevant by some Kent, 1995, 1996) . If only approximate consistency is de-manded, it is difficult to regard this condition as a fundamental concept of a physical theory, and the question of "how much" consistency is needed will inevitably arise.
g. Consistency and environment-induced superselection.
The relationship between consistency and environmentinduced superselection, and therefore the connection between the decoherence functional and the diagonalization of the reduced density matrix through environmental decoherence, has been investigated by various authors. The basic idea, promoted, for example, by Zurek (1993) and Paz and Zurek (1993) , is to suggest that if the interaction with the environment leads to rapid superselection of a preferred basis which approximately diagonalizes the local density matrix, coarse-grained histories defined in this basis will automatically be (approximately) consistent.
This approach has been explored by Twamley (1993b) who carried out detailed calculations in the context of a quantum optical model of phase space decoherence and compared the results with two-time projected phase space histories of the same model system. It was found that when the parameters of the interacting environment were changed such that the degree of diagonality of the reduced density matrix in the emerging preferred pointer basis was increased, histories in that basis also became more consistent. For a similar model, however, Twamley (1993a) also showed that the requirements of consistency and diagonality in a pointer basis as possible criteria for the emergence of quasiclassicality may exhibit a very different dependence on the initial conditions.
Extensive studies on the connection between Schmidt states, pointer states and consistent quasiclassical histories have also been presented by Albrecht (1992 Albrecht ( , 1993 , based on analytical calculations and numerical simulations of toy models for decoherence, including detailed numerical results on the violation of the sum rule for histories composed of different (Schmidt and pointer) projector bases. It was demonstrated that the presence of stable system-environment correlations ("records"), as demanded by the criterion for the selection of the pointer basis, was of great importance in making certain histories consistent. The relevance of "records" for the consistent histories approach in ensuring the "permanence of the past" has also been emphasized by other authors, for example, by Zurek (1993 Zurek ( , 2003a , Paz and Zurek (1993) and in the "strong decoherence" criterion of Gell-Mann and Hartle (1998) . The redundancy with which information about the system is recorded in the environment and can thus be found out by different observers without measurably disturbing the system itself has been suggested to allow for the notion of "objectively existing histories", based on environment-selected projectors that represent sequences of "objectively existing" quasiclassical events Zurek, 1993 Zurek, , 2003a .
In general, dampening of quantum coherence caused by decoherence will necessarily lead to a loss of quantum interference between individual histories (but not vice versa-see the discussion by Twamley, 1993b) , since the final trace operation over the environment in the decoherence functional will make the off-diagonal elements very small due to the decoherence-induced approximate mutual orthogonality of the environmental states. Finkelstein (1993) has used this observation to propose a new decoherence condition that coincides with the original definition, Eqs. (5.9) and (5.10), except for restricting the trace to E, rather than tracing over both S and E. It was shown that this condition not only implies the consistency condition of Eq. (5.13), but that it also characterizes those histories which decohere due to the interaction with the environment and lead to the formation of "records" of the state of the system in the environment.
h. Summary and discussion. The core difficulty associated with the consistent histories approach has been the explanation of the emergence of the quasiclassical world of our experience from the underlying quantum nature. Initially, it was hoped that quasiclassicality could be derived from the consistency criterion alone. Soon, however, the status and the rôle of this criterion in the formalism and its proper interpretation became rather unclear and diffuse, since exact consistency was shown to provide neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion for the selection of quasiclassical histories. The inclusion of decoherence effects into the consistent histories approach, leading to the emergence of stable quasiclassical pointer states, has been found to yield a highly efficient mechanism and a sensitive criterion for singling out quasiclassical observables that simultaneously fulfill the consistency criterion to a very good approximation due to the destruction of quantum coherence in the state of the system. The central question is then: What is the meaning and the remaining rôle of an explicit consistency criterion in the light of such "natural" mechanisms for the decoherence of histories? Can one dispose of this criterion as a key element of the fundamental theory by noting that for all "realistic" histories consistency will be likely to arise naturally from environment-induced decoherence alone anyhow?
The answer to this question may actually depend on the viewpoint one takes with respect to the aim of the consistent histories approach. As we have noted before, the original goal was simply to provide a formalism in which one could, in a measurement-free context, assign probabilities to certain sequences of quantum events without logical inconsistencies. The rather opposite view might be regarded as the aim of providing a formalism that selects only a very small subset of "meaningful", quasiclassical histories that all are consistent with our world of experience and whose projectors can be directly interpreted as "objective" physical events.
The consideration of decoherence effects that can give rise to effective superselection of possible quasiclassical (and consistent) histories certainly falls into the latter category. It is interesting to note that this approach has also led to a departure from the original "closed systems only" view to the study of local open quantum systems (and thus to the decomposition of the total Hilbert space into subsystems) within the consistent histories formalism. Besides the fact that decoherence intrinsically requires openness of systems, this move might also reflect the insight that the notion of classicality itself can be viewed as only arising from a conceptual division of the universe into parts (cf. the discussion in Sec. III.A).
Therefore environment-induced decoherence and superselection have played a remarkable rôle in consistent histories interpretations: a practical one by suggesting a physical selection mechanism for quasiclassical histories; and a conceptual one by contributing to a shift in the view of the relevance and the status of originally rather fundamental concepts, such as consistency, and aims of the consistent histories approach, like the focus on description of closed systems, including the universe in its entirety.
Modal interpretations
The first type of a modal interpretation was suggested by van Fraassen (1973 van Fraassen ( , 1991 , based on his program of "constructive empiricism" that proposes to take only empirical adequacy, but not necessarily "truth" as the goal of science. Since then, a large number of interpretations of quantum mechanics have been suggested that can be considered as modal (for a review and discussion of some of the basic properties and problems of such interpretations, see Clifton, 1996) .
In general, the approach of modal interpretations consists of weakening the e-e link by upholding the eigenstate → eigenvalue relation 19 , but by allowing for the ascription of definite measurement outcomes even if the system is not in an eigenstate of the observable representing the measurement. Thereby, one can preserve a purely unitary time evolution without the need for an additional collapse postulate to account for definite measurement results.
Of course, this immediately raises the question of how physical properties that are perceived through measurements and measurement results are connected to the state, since the bidirectional link between the eigenstate of the observable (that corresponds to the physical property) and the eigenvalue (namely, the manifestation of the value of this physical property in a measurement) is broken. The general goal of modal interpretations is then to specify rules that determine a catalogue of possibilities for the properties of a system that is described by the density matrix ρ at time t. Two different views are typically distinguished: a semantic approach that only changes the way of talking about the connection between properties and state; and a realistic view that provides a different specification of what the possible properties of a system really are, given the state vector (or the density matrix).
Such an attribution of possible properties must fulfill certain desiderata. For instance, probabilities for outcomes of measurements should be consistent with the usual Born probabilities of standard quantum mechanics; it should be possible to recover our experience of classicality in the perception of macroscopic objects; and an explicit time evolution of properties and their probabilities should be definable that is consistent with the results of the Schrödinger equation. As we shall see in the following, decoherence has frequently been employed in modal interpretations to motivate and define rules for property ascription. Dieks (1994a,b) has argued that one of the central goals of modal approaches is to provide an interpretation for decoherence. a. Property ascription and decoherence. The intrinsic difficulty of modal interpretations is to avoid any ad hoc character of the property ascription, yet to find generally applicable rules that lead to a selection of possible properties that include the determinate properties of our experience. To solve this problem, various modal interpretations have embraced the results of the decoherence program. A natural approach would be to employ the environment-induced superselection of a preferred basis-since it is based on an entirely physical and very general criterion (namely, the stability requirement) and has, for the cases studied, been shown to give results that agree well with our experience (thus matching van Fraassen's goal of empirical adequacy)-to yield sets of possible quasi-classical properties associated with the correct probabilities (frequencies).
Furthermore, since the decoherence program is solely based on Schrödinger dynamics, the task of defining a time evolution of the "property states" and their associated probabilities that is in agreement with the results of unitary quantum mechanics would presumably be easier than in a model of property ascription where the set of possibilities does not arise dynamically via the Schrödinger equation alone (for a detailed proposal of the latter type of modal dynamics, see Bacciagaluppi and Dickson, 1999) . The need for an explicit dynamics of property states in modal interpretations is controversial. One can argue that it suffices to show that each instant of time, the set of possibly possessed properties that can be ascribed to the system is empirically adequate in the sense of containing the properties of our experience, especially with respect to the properties of macroscopic objects (this is essentially the view of, for example, van Fraassen, 1973 van Fraassen, , 1991 . On the other hand, this cannot ensure that these prop-erties behave over time in agreement with our experience (for instance, that macroscopic objects that are left undisturbed do not change their position in space spontaneously in an observable manner). In other words, the emergence of classicality is not only to be tied to determinate properties at each instant of time, but also to the existence of quasiclassical "trajectories" in property space. Since decoherence allows one to reidentify components of the decohered density matrix over time, this could be used to derive property states with continuous, quasiclassical trajectory-like time evolution based on Schrödinger dynamics alone. For some discussions into this direction, see Hemmo (1996) and Bacciagaluppi and Dickson (1999) .
The fact that the states emerging from decoherence and the stability criterion are sometimes nonorthogonal or form a continuum will presumably be of even lesser relevance in modal interpretations than in Everett-style interpretations (see Sec. V.D.1) since the goal is here solely to specify sets of possible properties of which only one set gets actually ascribed, such that an "overlap" of the sets is not necessarily a problem (besides the potential difficulty of a straightforward ascription of probabilities in this case).
It is, however, usually rather difficult to explicitely determine the robust "pointer states" through the stability criterion, such that it would not be easy to comprehensively formulate a general rule for property ascription based on environment-induced superselection. To simplify this situation, several modal interpretations have restricted themselves to the orthogonal decomposition of the density matrix to define the set of properties that can be ascribed (see, for instance, Bub, 1997; Dieks, 1989; Healey, 1989; Kochen, 1985; Vermaas and Dieks, 1995) . For example, the approach of Dieks (1989) recognizes, by referring to the decoherence program, the relevance of the environment by considering a composite systemenvironment state vector and its diagonal Schmidt decomposition, |ψ = k √ p k |φ S k |φ E k , which always exists. Possible properties that can be ascribed to the system are then represented by the Schmidt projectors
Although all terms are present in the Schmidt expansion (that Dieks calls the "mathematical state"), the "physical state" is postulated to be given by only one of the terms, with probability p k . A generalization of this approach to a decomposition into any number of subsystems has been described by Vermaas and Dieks (1995) . In this sense, the Schmidt decomposition itself is taken to define an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Dieks (1995) has given a physical motivation for the Schmidt decomposition in modal interpretations based on the assumed requirement of a one-to-one correspondence between the properties of the system and its environment. For a comment on the violation of the property composition principle in such interpretations, see the analysis by Clifton (1996) .
A central problem associated with the approach of orthogonal decomposition lies in the fact that it is not at all clear that the properties determined by the Schmidt diagonalization represent the determinate properties of our experience. As indicated in Sec. III.F, the states selected by the (instantaneous) orthogonal decomposition of the reduced density matrix will in general differ from the robust "pointer states" chosen by the stability criterion of the decoherence program and may have distinctly nonclassical properties. That this will especially be the case when the states selected by the orthogonal decomposition are close to degeneracy has already been indicated in Sec. III.F, but was also in more detail explored in the context of modal interpretations by Bacciagaluppi et al. (1995) and Donald (1998) . It was also shown that in the case of near degeneracy (as it typically occurs for macroscopic systems with many degrees of freedom), the resulting projectors will then also be extremely sensitive to the precise form of the state (Bacciagaluppi et al., 1995) , which is clearly undesired since the projectors (and thus the properties of the system) will not be well-behaved under the inevitable approximations employed in physics (Donald, 1998) .
Others authors have therefore used the orthogonal decomposition of the decohered reduced density matrix (instead of the decomposition of the instantaneous density matrix) which has led to noteworthy results. For the case of the system being represented by an only finite-dimensional Hilbert space, and thus for a discrete model of decoherence, the resulting states have indeed been found to be typically close to the robust states selected by the stability criterion (for macroscopic systems, this typically means localization in position space), unless again the final composite state is very nearly degenerate (Bacciagaluppi and Hemmo, 1996; Bene, 2001 ; see also Sec. III.F). Thus in this case decoherence ensures that the definite properties selected by modal interpretations of the Dieks type when based on the orthogonal decomposition of the reduced decohered density matrix will be appropriately close to the properties corresponding to the ideal pointer states selected by the stability criterion.
On the other hand, Bacciagaluppi (2000) has shown that when the more general and realistic case of an infinite-dimensional state space of the system is considered and thus a continuous model of decoherence is employed (namely, that of Joos and Zeh, 1985) , the predictions of the modal interpretations of Dieks (1989) and Vermaas and Dieks (1995) and those suggested by decoherence can differ in a significant way. It was demonstrated that the definite properties obtained from the orthogonal decomposition of the decohered density matrix are highly delocalized (that is, smeared out over the entire spread of the state), although the coherence length of the density matrix itself was shown to be very small such that decoherence had indicated very localized properties. Thus based on these results (and similar ones of Donald, 1998) , decoherence can be used to argue for the physical inadequacy of the rule for the ascription of definite properties as proposed by Dieks (1989) and Vermaas and Dieks (1995) .
More generally, if, as in the above case, the definite properties selected by the modal interpretation fail to mesh with the results of decoherence (of course in particular when they furthermore lack the desired classicality and correspondence to the determinate properties of our experience), we are given reason to doubt whether the proposed rules for property ascription bear sufficient physical motivation, legitimacy, and generality.
b. Concluding remarks. There are many different proposals that can be summarized under the label of a modal interpretation. They all share the problem of both motivating and verifying a consistent system of property ascription. Using the robust pointer states selected by the interaction with the environment and by the stability criterion as a solution to this problem is a step into the right direction, but the difficulty remains to derive a general rule for property ascription from this method that would yield explicitely the sets of possibilities in every situation. Since the alternative, simpler approach of deriving the possible properties from the orthogonal decomposition of the (decohered reduced) density matrix fails in certain cases, for example, close to degeneracy and in Hilbert state spaces of infinite dimension (where it then will typically not lead to the sharply localized, quasiclassical pointer states as selected by environmental robustness criteria), decoherence can play a vital rôle in a potential falsification of rules for property ascription in modal interpretations.
Bohmian Mechanics
Bohm's approach (Bohm, 1952; Bohm and Bub, 1966; Bohm and Hiley, 1993 ) is a modification of de Broglie's (1930) original "pilot wave" proposal. In Bohmian mechanics, a system containing N (nonrelativistic) particles is described by a wave function ψ and the configuration Q(t) = (q 1 (t), . . . , q N (t)) ∈ R 3N of particle positions q i (t), i.e., the state of the system is represented by (ψ, Q) for each instant t. The evolution of the system is guided by two equations. The wave function ψ(t) is transformed as usual via the standard Schrödinger equation, i ∂ ∂t ψ = Hψ, (5.15) whereas the particle positions q i (t) of the configuration Q(t) evolve according to the "guiding equation" dq i dt = v ψ i (q 1 , . . . , q N ) ≡ m i Im ψ * ∇ qi ψ ψ * ψ (q 1 , . . . , q N ), (5.16) where m i is the mass of the i-th particle. Thus particles follow trajectories described by Q(t); the distribution ρ of the configuration Q(t) of the system is assumed to be given by the quantum equilibrium distribution ρ = |ψ| 2 . a. Particles as fundamental entities. Bohm's approach has been critized for ascribing fundamental ontological status to the concept of particles. General arguments against particles on a fundamental level of any relativistic quantum theory have been frequently given (see, for instance, Halvorson and Clifton, 2002; Malament, 1996) . 20 Moreover, and this is the point we would like to discuss in the following, it has been argued that particles ("discontinuities in space") can be shown as emerging from the continuous process of decoherence, leading to claims that no fundamental rôle needs to be attributed to particles (Zeh, 1993 (Zeh, , 1999b . Based on decohered density matrices of mesoscopic and macroscopic systems that essentially always represent quasi-ensembles of narrow wave packets in position space, Zeh (1993, p. 190 ) holds that such wave packets can be viewed as representing individual "particle" positions:
All particle aspects observed in measurements of quantum fields (like spots on a plate, tracks in a bubble chamber, or clicks of a counter) can be understood by taking into account this decoherence of the relevant local (i.e., subsystem) density matrix.
The first, obvious, question is then whether a narrow wave packet in position space can be identified with the subjective experience of a "particle". 21 The answer appears to be in the positive: our notion of "particles" hinges on the property of localizability, i.e., the possibility of a definition of a region of space Ω ∈ R 3 in which the system (that is, the support of the wave function) is entirely contained. Although the nature of the Schrödinger dynamics implies that any wave function will have nonvanishing support ("tails") outside of any finite spatial region Ω and therefore exact localizatibility will never be achieved, we only need to demand approximate localizability to account for our experience of particle aspects.
However, note that to interpret ensembles of narrow wavepackets (resulting from decoherence) as leading to the perception of individual particles, we must embed standard quantum mechanics (with decoherence) into an additional interpretive framework that explains why only one of the wavepackets is perceived 22 ; that is, we do need 20 On the other hand, there have been proposals for a "Bohmian mechanics of quantum fields", i.e., a theory that embeds quantum field theory into a Bohmian-style framework (Dürr et al., 2003a,b) . 21 Schrödinger (1926) had made an attempt into a similar direction but had failed since the Schrödinger equation tends to continuously spread out any localized wavepacket when it is considered as describing an isolated system. The inclusion of an interacting environment and thus decoherence counteracts the spread and opens the possibility to maintain narrow wavepackets over time (Joos and Zeh, 1985) . 22 Zeh himself adheres, similar to Zurek (1998) , to an Everett-style branching to which distinct observers are attached (Zeh, 1993) , see also the quote in Sec. V.D.1.
to add some interpretive rule to get from the improper ensemble emerging from decoherence to the perception of individual terms, so decoherence alone does not necessarily make Bohm's particle concept superfluous. But it suggests that the postulate of particles as fundamental entities could be unnecessary, and taken together with the difficulties in reconciling such a particle theory with a relativistic quantum field theory, Bohm's a priori assumption of particles at a fundamental level of the theory appears seriously challenged.
b. Bohmian trajectories and decoherence. A well-known property of Bohmian mechanics is the fact that its trajectories are often highly nonclassical (see, for example, Appleby, 1999a; Bohm and Hiley, 1993; Holland, 1993) . This poses the serious problem of how Bohm's theory can explain the existence of quasi-classical trajectories on a macroscopic level. Bohm and Hiley (1993) considered the scattering of a beam of environmental particles on a macroscopic system-today well-studied as one of the possible process leading to decoherence (Joos and Zeh, 1985; Joos et al., 2003) -to demonstrate that this yields quasi-classical trajectories for the system. It has furthermore been shown that for isolated systems, the Bohm theory will typically not give the correct classical limit (Appleby, 1999a) . It has thus been suggested that the inclusion of the environment and of the resulting decoherence effects may be helpful in recovering quasiclassical trajectories in Bohmian mechanics (Allori, 2001; Appleby, 1999b; Sanz and Borondo, 2003; Zeh, 1999b) .
We have mentioned before that the interaction between a macroscopic system and its environment will typically lead to a rapid approximate diagonalization of the reduced density matrix in position space, and thus to spatially localized wavepackets that follow (approximately) Hamiltonian trajectories. (This observation also provides a physical motivation for the choice of position as the fundamental preferred basis in Bohm's theory-in agreement with Bell's (1982) well-known comment that "in physics the only observations we must consider are position observations, if only the positions of instrument pointers.") The intuitive step is then to associate these trajectories with the Bohmian trajectories Q(t) which the particles of the Bohm theory follow. As pointed out by Bacciagaluppi (2003b) , a great advantage of this strategy lies in the fact that the same approach would allow for a recovery of both quantum and classical phenomena.
However, a careful analysis by Appleby (1999b) has shown that this decoherence-induced diagonalization in the position basis alone will in general not suffice to yield quasi-classical trajectories in Bohm's theory; only under certain additional assumptions will processes that lead to decoherence also give correct quasi-classical Bohmian trajectories for macroscopic systems (Appleby described the example of the long-time limit of a system that has initially been prepared in an energy eigenstate). Interesting results have also been reported by Allori and coworkers (Allori, 2001; . They showed that decoherence effects can play the rôle of preserving classical properties of Bohmian trajectories; furthermore, they demonstrated that while in standard quantum mechanics it is important to maintain narrow wavepackets to account for the emergence of classicality, the Bohmian description of a system by both its wave function and configuration allows for the derivation of quasi-classical behavior from highly delocalized wave functions. Sanz and Borondo (2003) studied the double-slit experiment in the framework of Bohmian mechanics and in the presence of decoherence and showed that even when coherence is fully lost and thus interference is absent, nonlocal quantum correlations remain that influence the dynamics of the particles in the Bohm theory, demonstrating that in this example decoherence does not suffice to achieve the classical limit in Bohmian mechanics.
In conclusion, while the basic idea of employing decoherence-related processes to yield the correct classical limit of Bohmian trajectories seems reasonable, many details of this approach still need to be worked out.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented an extensive discussion of the rôle of the decoherence program in the foundations of quantum mechanics, with a particular focus on the implication of decoherence for the measurement problem and for various interpretive approaches of quantum mechanics.
A key achievement of the decoherence program is the recognition of the importance of the openness of quantum systems for their realistic description. The well-known phenomenon of quantum entanglement had already early in the history of quantum mechanics demonstrated that correlations between systems can lead to "paradoxial" properties of the composite system that cannot be composed from the properties of the individual systems. Nonetheless the classical notion of the necessity of considering the idealization of isolated systems for an "exact description" of physical systems had dominated also the quantum theory for a long time. It is the great merit of the decoherence program to have emphasized the ubiquity and essential inescapability of system-environment correlations and to have established a new view on the rôle of such correlations as being a key factor in explaining how "classicality" can emerge from quantum systems.
We have argued that within standard "textbook" quantum mechanics (that assumes the eigenvalueeigenstate link), decoherence does not solve the measurement problem: we are still left with a multitude of (albeit individually well-localized quasi-classical) components of the wave function, and we need to supplement or otherwise to interpret this situation in order to explain why and how single outcomes are perceived. Accordingly, we have discussed how decoherence can motivate (and possibly falsify) alternative interpretive approaches towards a resolution of the measurement problem.
With respect to the preferred basis problem of quantum measurement, decoherence provides a very promising definition of preferred pointer states via a physically meaningful requirement, namely, the robustness criterion, and describes methods to operationally specify and select such states (for example, via the commutativity criterion or by extremizing an appropriate measure such as purity or von Neumann entropy). In particular, the fact that macroscopic systems virtually always decohere into position eigenstates gives a physical explanation for why position is the ubiquitous determinate property of the world of our experience.
The decoherence-induced suppression of interference terms in the local observer-relevant description of a system and the environment-induced superselection of quasi-classical pointer states have been a highly useful and frequently employed starting point for a consistent and empirically adequate definition of determinate properties, relative-state branches, etc., in various classes of interpretations of quantum mechanics. They also provide a physical motivation for rules and assumptions of interpretive approaches and indicate where these might be incorrect or lack generality (for instance in certain types of modal interpretations). Moreover, they suggest that certain postulates of "physical" interpretations (such as collapse theories or Bohmian mechanics) may effectively be deduced from decoherence-related effects alone, i.e., from the dynamical interaction with the environment. It has also become clear that decoherence can ensure the empirical adequacy and thus empirical equivalence of different interpretive approaches, which has led some to the claim that the choice, for example, between the orthodox and the Everett interpretation becomes "purely a matter of taste, roughly equivalent to whether one believes mathematical language or human language to be more fundamental" (Tegmark, 1998, p. 855) .
It is fair to say that the decoherence program sheds new light on many foundational aspects of quantum mechanics. It paves a physics-based path towards motivating solutions to the measurement problem; it imposes constraints on the strands of interpretations that seek such a solution and thus makes them also more and more similar to each other. Decoherence remains an ongoing field of intense research, both in the theoretical and experimental domain, and we can expect further implications for the foundations of quantum mechanics from such studies in the near future. on a draft of the manuscript and illuminating exchanges.
